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I. INTRODUCTION
Many critically acclaimed buildings were designed by H.H. Richardson,
Louis Sullivan, Frank Lloyd Wright, Max Abramovitz, Robert Venturi and other
highly regarded American architects during the latter part of the nineteenth
century and through most of the twentieth century. Their artistry flourished
even though their works received only second-class protection under United
States copyright law until 1990. Architects and their works did not receive the
same level of protection that copyright law extended to the paintings,
sculptures, and other works of authorship created by their highly regarded
contemporaries in those other fine arts. The Copyright Act of 1909 did not
include architectural plans, blueprints, designs, or models as copyrightable
subject matter, and the 1976 Act did not mention architectural works either.'
Even though our copyright statutes were silent about architecture until 1990,
it was well established that plans, blueprints and models were copyrightable
writings under the 1909 Act's category of "drawings or plastic works of a
scientific or technical character," 2 and then as "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works" under the 1976 Act.3 The scope of an architect's copyright protection
was, however, quite limited. The unauthorized copying of plans or blueprints
constituted infringement, 4 but most authorities concluded that plans were not
infringed by using them, without the architect's permission, to construct the
building they depicted.5 Moreover, the prevailing view was that an architect's
rights did not extend to the actual building derived from his or her plans.6 A
building, as a useful article,7 could be protected by copyright only to the extent
I MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAw 130 (5th ed. 2010); David Shipley,
Copynght Protecfion forArchitectural Works, 37 S.C. L. REv. 393, 395 (1986).
2 17 U.S.C. 5 5(i) (1973).
3 17 U.S.C. $ 102(a)(5) (2006). See also Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1227 (9th
Cir. 2000) (Fisher, J., dissenting). The definition of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works was
amended in 1990 to include architectural plans. Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 4(a)(1)(A), 102 Stat. 2853
(1988) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101).
4 See, e.g., Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Const. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252 (D.
Neb. 1982); Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1981).
5 Compare Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Maddox, 379 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1967), with Imperial Homes v.
Lamont, 458 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Shipley, supra note 1, at 403-06; LEAFFER, supra
note 1, at 130-31 ("[C]opyright in architectural plans or models did not convey a right to control
their use.").
6 Shipley, supra note 1, at 395.
7 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT %§ 2.15.1, 2:183 (1996) (buildings erected from blueprints
and plans will rarely qualify as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works because their intrinsic
utilitarian function makes them "useful articles"). A useful article is defined as "an article having
an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to
convey information. An article that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a 'useful
article.'" 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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it had artistic features that could be identified separately from, and were capable
of existing independently of, the structure's utilitarian aspects.8
The useful article limitation on protection meant that embellishments and
other unnecessary ornamentation added to a structure could be protected by
copyright, but that most aspects of a building enjoyed little, if any, protection.
However, monumental, nonfunctional works of architecture were protected
under Section 102(a)(5) as sculptural works. 0 As a result, Eero Saarinen's
Gateway Arch in St. Louis enjoyed copyright protection but hardly any
protection was afforded to his design of the Laird Bell Law Quadrangle at the
University of Chicago or Mies Van der Rohe's famous apartment buildings on
Lake Shore Drive in Chicago.
Almost twenty-five years ago, I published an article advocating both judicial
recognition of an architect's right to control the use of his or her plans and of
an expansive definition of the copyrightable aspects of functional structures.
My rationale for advocating these positions was that architects deserved
protection comparable to what copyright law afforded creators of other artistic
and sculptural works," and that enhanced protection would promote progress
in this important profession.12 I can take no credit, though, for what happened
several years after my article was published when, in 1990, Congress enacted the
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act (AWCPA) and thereby
dramatically changed the copyright status of architecture in the United States.' 3
The AWCPA was passed soon after United States' adherence to the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works became
effective.14  Congress, in passing this statute, recognized that expanding
protection for architecture would "stimulate excellence in design, thereby
enriching our public environment in keeping with the constitutional goal."s
The AWCPA is said to confer full protection to works of architecture' 6 by
establishing them as a new category of protectable subject matter in
8 Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1227-28 (Fisher J., dissenting); LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 130.
9 LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 130.
10 Shipley, supra note 1, at 424-25; H.R. REP. No. 101-735, at 18 n.43 (1990), reputined in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6944 [hereinafter H.R. REP.].
11 Shipley, supra note 1, at 444--45.
12 Id. at 448.
13 Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5133
(1990). I did, however, express some of my opinions to the Copyright Office in response to a
Notice of Inquiry. See Letter from Professor David E. Shipley to Library of Congress, Copyright
Office (Sept. 10, 1988), reprinted in The Register of Copyrights, Copyright in Order of
Architecture, app. C (June 19, 1989) [hereinafter Shipley letter].
14 The United States joined the Berne Convention on March 1, 1989, and Congress passed the
AWCPA to comply with treaty obligations. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 206-07 (8th
ed. 2010).
Is H.R. REP., supra note 10, at 12.
16 LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 132.
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Section 102(a)(8)17 and defining an architectural work as: "the design of a
building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a
building, architectural plans, or drawings. The work includes the overall form
as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the
design, but does not include individual standard features." 8
There have been many decisions interpreting and applying the AWCPA
since it became effective in 1990.19 There are routine disputes over ownership
of plans, 20 there are claims involving unauthorized copying of plans, 21 and there
are cases involving the alleged infringement of buildings like condominium
complexeS22 and large.homes. 23 Some of these decisions are very interesting.
For example, Shine v. Childs involved the alleged infringement of an architecture
student's designs for a twisting skyscraper with an elongated diamond pattern
by an established architect's design for the new Freedom Tower at the World
Trade Center site in New York City.24 A leading copyright law casebook 25
states in a note following its presentation of Shine v. Childs that
17 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (1990).
18 Id. § 101. See generall LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 132-33. Some of the points I made in my
article while arguing for expanding protection are reflected in this definition. For instance, I
stated that an architect's copyright should not cover processes or methods of construction or the
use of elements like skylights, atriums, and domes. "Rather, it is the designer's particular
arrangement, treatment, and configuration of such unprotectible elements that should be
regarded as the copyrightable expression embodied in both his plans and the structure." Shipley,
supra note 1, at 445. This is similar to the AWCPA's definition of architectural work.
19 Cf LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 132 ("[T]he courts have only begun to create a body of law
providing significant guidance on what constitutes originality for architectural works.").
20 See, e.g., Watkins v. Chesapeake Custom Homes, 330 F. Supp. 2d 563 (D. Md. 2004)
(builders modified their copyrighted plans to reflect owners' revisions; owners then registered
copyright on these plans and sued builders for infringement and builders won on summary
judgment because owners' plans, as derivative works, did not qualify for copyright protection and
owners failed to show that builders had copied their work); Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494 (6th
Cir. 1998); Phelps & Assocs. v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532 (4th Cir. 2007); Zitz v. Pereira, 119 F.
Supp. 2d 133 (E.D. N.Y. 1999), af'd, 225 F.3d 646 (2d Cir. 2000) and 232 F.3d 290 (2d Cir.
2000).
21 See, e.g., Precision Craft Log Structures, Inc. v. Cabin Kit Co., No. CIV 05-199-S-EJL, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3829, at *3 (D. Idaho Jan. 17, 2007).
22 See, e.g., Chirco v. Rosewood Vill., L.L.C., No. 03CV72145DT, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
43748, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2005), accepted, in part, rejected, in part, Chirco v. Rosewood Vill.,
L.L.C., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70197 (E.D. Mich., Sept. 28, 2006); Chirco v. Gateway Oaks,
L.L.C., No. 02-CV-73188, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43081 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 26, 2005).
2 See, e.g., Richmond Homes Mgmt. v. Raintree, 862 F. Supp. 1517 (W.D. Va. 1994), afd in
part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 66 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 1995).
24 382 F. Supp. 2d 602 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
25 I teach Copyright from a very comprehensive casebook written by four highly regarded
copyright law scholars: Craig Joyce, Marshall Leaffer, Peter Jaszi and Tyler Ochoa. Their
materials on architectural works are excellent. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 14, at 206-20. The
architecture student's infringement claim in Shine withstood a summary judgment motion filed by
the established architect and his highly regarded architectural firm. The case is presented in id. at
208-15.
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[m]ost architectural works cases deal with alleged infringement of
designs less fanciful than the one involved in Shine. A good deal
of litigation concerns competing plans for mass-produced "semi-
custom" development homes, which consist of a combination of
elements that might be called "standard features," incapable of
copyright protection in themselves. 26
In another note, this casebook's authors state:
Like most architectural works cases, those just cited involve
relatively "mundane" works. Is copyright protection really
necessary to protect these works? For that matter, is copyright
needed at all to encourage creativity in the field of architecture?
How is it that the United States was at the forefront of
architectural creativity for more than 100 years without such
protection?27
I know enough about the history of architecture to be in full agreement with
the casebook authors' statement about the United States being at the forefront
of architectural creativity for more than a century without having full copyright
protection. Moreover, after reading scores of decisions involving the AWCPA,
I also agree with the authors' statement that most reported cases involve
relatively mundane works. Cases like Shine v. Childs are the exception, not the
rule. It is reasonable to ask, after analyzing many trial and appellate court
opinions, whether the AWCPA has made much of a difference in the last
twenty years.
This Article discusses variations on the casebook authors' questions of
whether the protection provided by the AWCPA is needed for mundane
architectural works, and whether copyright protection is needed as an incentive
for architects. Specifically, it addresses the impact of the AWCPA and
considers whether that act has made a significant difference for architects and
architecture.
I have read, categorized, and analyzed most of the architecture copyright
decisions reported since 1990. I will not swear that I have located and read
every case, but I have pored over more than enough to feel confident in making
the following statements about the impact of the AWCPA:
* Disputes over the ownership of plans and blueprints were
litigated before 1990 and they have been litigated regularly
since the passage of the AWCPA.
2 Id. at (7) on 216.
27 Id. at (8) on 217.
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* Litigation over the alleged infringement of plans and
blueprints was common before 1990 and these disputes have
been litigated regularly since the passage of the AWCPA.
However, unlike the pre-1990 case law, it is now settled that
unauthorized use of plans constitutes infringement.
* Even with the AWCPA's expansive definition of
"architectural work," the many reported decisions show that
the scope of copyright protection for most architectural works
is thin. As a result, the architect plaintiff will ordinarily have
to prove close to verbatim reproduction in order to win.
* The thin scope of protection for architectural works is due to
several related factors: most buildings are functional;
individual standard features cannot be protected; an architect's
arrangement and composition of design features is often
treated as. analogous to a compilation; and the idea/expression
dichotomy and the scenes a faire doctrine both operate to
restrict the protectable elements in architectural works.
* Relatively unique, custom-designed structures may benefit to
some extent from the protection afforded by the AWCPA,
but there are limits to how far a court can go in protecting a
particular style or school of architecture. Thus, architect
plaintiffs face a daunting task even in those cases where a
court gets to the point of asking whether the total concept
and feel of the parties' architectural works is substantially
similar.
Notwithstanding the difficult task of proving substantial similarity of
protected expression, there have been many more architectural works
infringement cases litigated and decided in the last twenty years than were
reported prior to the passage of the AWCPA in 1990. Perhaps this legislation
has given architects who believe that their works have been infringed some
confidence in threatening litigation or negotiating settlement after a suit is filed.
However, it is difficult to say whether the AWCPA has encouraged architectural
creativity or served to discourage some architects from evoking certain styles
out of fear of being sued.2 8 Other than benefiting, to some degree, relatively
unique, custom-designed structures, the AWCPA has not had a substantial
impact on architects and architecture because the scope of copyright protection
for most architectural works is thin.
28 Cf LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 132.
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II. THE NEED FOR PROTECTION AND DEFINING AN
"ARCHITECTURAL WORK"
Copyright protection subsists in original works that are "fixed in any
tangible medium of expression."2 9 The copyrightability of architectural plans,
blueprints, and renderings was well established long before the passage of the
AWCPA in 1990.30 However, prior to 1990, copyright protection was not
extended to the actual buildings depicted in plans, blueprints, renderings,
drawings, and models, due in large part to the Copyright Act's "useful article"
limitation.31 The substantial change made by the AWCPA was the extension of
copyright protection to fully constructed works of architecture like houses,
office towers, condominium complexes, and parking decks. 32 "It confers full
protection on works of architecture." 33
There are several related reasons for enactment of the AWCPA in 1990.
One is that architecture is an important form of artistic expression worthy of
protection.
Architecture plays a central role in our daily lives, not only as a
form of shelter or as an investment, but also as a work of art....
We rarely appreciate works of architecture alone, but instead
typically view them in conjunction with other structures and the
29 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990).
30 Shipley, supra note 1, at 398-99. A "useful article" is defined as "an article having an
intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to
convey information." 17 U.S.C. § 101. Plans and blueprints convey information to the builder
about how to erect the depicted building, and are copyrightable works that function to portray
the appearance of a useful article-the completed structure. Shipley, supra note 1, at 398 n.18.
31 Raleigh Newsam, Architecture and Copyright Separating the Poetic from the Prosaic, 71 TUL. L. REv.
1073, 1077 (1997); Shipley, supra note 1, at 433-35 (arguing for expanded protection while noting
that most authorities had concluded that functional structures, although attractively designed,
were not entitled to copyright protection); LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 131.
32 Andrew Pollock, Comment, The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act: Analysis of Probable
Ramifications andArising Issues, 70 NEB. L. REV. 873, 874 (1991); LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 133. See,
e.g., Intervest Constr. v. Canterbury Estates Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d 914 (11th Cir. 2008) (litigation
involving plans depicting four bedroom homes); Chirco v. Rosewood Vill., L.L.C., No.
03CV72145DT, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43748 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2005), accepted, in part, rejected,
in part, Chirco v. Rosewood Vill., L.L.C., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70197 (E.D. Mich., Sept. 28,
2006) (upon reconsideration, grant of summary judgment for defendant in litigation over
condominium complex design denied given material issues as to access, substantial similarity and
independent creation); Shine v. Childs, 382 F. Supp. 2d 602 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (litigation over
designs for a skyscraper to be built on the World Trade Center site); Moser Pilon Nelson
Architects, L.L.C. v. HNTB Corp., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1085 (D. Conn. 2006) (parking deck at
a university in Connecticut).
33 LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 133.
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environment at large, where, at their best, they serve to express
the goals and aspirations of the entire community.34
That is a lofty statement about the importance of architecture. Others have
said that it "is the most commonly experienced and pervasive of all the arts.
The creative efforts of architects culminate in structures used for shelter,
pleasure, business, entertainment, and transportation."35
The drafters of the AWCPA echoed these sentiments, saying that
"[p]rotection for works of architecture should stimulate excellence in design,
thereby enriching our public environment in keeping with the constitutional
goal .. ."36 I wrote roughly the same thing about twenty-five years ago,
arguing that architects deserved to be rewarded for their creativity.37 I asserted
that "[i]n order to promote progress in this important art form and to grant
architects copyright protection commensurate to that already enjoyed by other
artists, the courts should reconsider their approaches to [the unauthorized use
of plans and defining the copyrightable aspects of buildings]." 38
Another reason for amending the Copyright Act so that greater protection
was afforded to architecture involved treaty obligations. The United States
became an adherent to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works on March 1, 1989.39 This convention requires member states to
afford copyright protection to " 'works of architecture' - the constructed
design of buildings," as distinct from plans, illustrations, and sketches.40 After
being directed to undertake a full review of the protection afforded architecture
under the 1976 Act, the Register of Copyrights concluded on June 19, 1989,
notwithstanding disagreement within the Copyright Office, that the Berne
Convention required the United States to afford full protection to architectural
works.41 As a result, the AWCPA was enacted and became effective December
1, 1990.42 The Act covers architectural works created on or after that date and
34 H.R. REP., supra note 10, at 11.
3s Shipley, supra note 1, at 394 (citing Hellmuth, Obsolescence Ab Initio: The New Act and
Architectural Copyrght, 22 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 169, 170-71 (1974)).
36 H.R. REP., supra note 10, at 12.
37 Shipley, supra note 1, at 395-96.
38 Id. at 448-49.
39 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853; JOYCE
ET AL., supra note 14, at 35-37.
40 H.R. REP., supra note 10, at 10.
41 Id at 11.
42 Architectural Works Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5133 (1990). Works that
were constructed or otherwise published before December 1, 1990 are not eligible for protection
under the AWCPA. 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(d)(3) (2009). The issue of whether a particular
architectural work falls under the AWCPA has been litigated. See, e.g., Zitz v. Pereira, 232 F.3d
290 (2d Cir. 2000) (affirming lower court's determination that the AWCPA did not apply to
plaintiff's work because the townhouse was substantially completed as of December 1, 1990);
Lindal Cedar Homes, Inc., v. Ireland, No. 03-6102-TC, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18878 (D. Or.
2010] 9
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included unconstructed works embodied in unpublished plans provided those
works were constructed before December 31, 2002.43
The AWCPA amended the list of categories of works of authorship in
Section 102(a) to include "architectural works" as a new category.44 The
AWCPA added to Section 101 the definition of an "architectural work" as "the
design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression,
including a building, architectural plans, or drawings. The work includes the
overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and
elements in the design, but does not include individual standard features." 45
The legislation did not, however, define the term "building." Copyright
Office regulations implementing the AWCPA define "buildings" as "humanly
habitable structures that are intended to be both permanent and stationary, such
as houses and office buildings, and other permanent and stationary structures
designed for human occupancy, including but not limited to churches,
museums, gazebos, and garden pavilions."46
According to the AWCPA's legislative history, the term "building" includes
structures that are used by, but not inhabited by, humans, like churches and
pergolas; it does not extend to mobile homes and non-habitable, three-
dimensional structures like dams, canals, highways, and bridges.47  These
limitations on what is a protectable building are also reflected in regulations that
provide that "[s]tructures other than buildings, such as bridges, cloverleafs,
dams, walkways, tents, recreational vehicles, mobile homes, and boats" cannot
be registered.48 However, monumental, nonfunctional works of architecture
that could be protected under section 102(a)(5) as pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works before the passage of the AWCPA are now protected as
architectural works under Section 102(a)(8).49
Sept. 14, 2004) (plaintiff concedes that it has no claim under the AWCPA but court notes that
nothing in AWCPA affects protection for plans as pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works). See
aOloJOYCE ET AL., supra note 14, at 210 n.10.
43 Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act § 706. See 17 U.S.C. § 303 (2006). See also
LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 135.
4 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8).
45 Id. § 101.
4 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(b)(2) (2010).
47 H.R. REP., supra note 10, at 18-20.
48 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(d)(1). A House subcommittee deleted the term "three-dimensional
structure" from the draft legislation, fearing that it might include works like bridges, canals, and
other parts of the nation's transit system. The rationale for deletion was that protection was not
needed to stimulate creativity or to block unauthorized copying. Pollack, supra note 32, at 875.
49 H.R. REP., supra note 10, at 18 & n.43. Whether monumental works like the Statute of
Liberty or the Gateway Arch might be better treated as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works
instead of architectural works is discussed in another section of this Article. See infra notes 247-
59 and accompanying text in connection with Section 120(a) pictorial remnant-item limiting on
architectural copyright protection. Cf Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 270 n.4 (2d Cir. 2005)
(noting that "Frank Gehry's Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao is a work, and it has recognized
stature as art, but it could not be made to fit within the statute's definition of a 'work of visual
10 [Vol. 18:1
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A. WHAT IS A BUILDING?
There has been litigation since 1990 over what constitutes a building that
can be protected as an architectural work. This may reflect the fact that
architects and other designers create a wide variety of structures.50 Homes,5'
condominiums,52 skyscrapers,53 and restaurantS54 are easy but, as noted in the
previous paragraph's summary of Copyright Office regulations and the
AWCPA's legislative history, things are not so clear with some structures.55
For instance, does a building have to be a free standing structure? In Yankee
Candle Co. v. New England Candle Co., the court held that a store enclosed within
a shopping mall was not an architectural work entitled to protection, even
though the mall itself qualified as a building.5 6 The court stated that the
ambiguous nature of the term "building" "might leave a structure like Fenway
Park, one of the greatest architectural works ever designed, undeserving of
copyright protection as a building without a roof over its baseball diamond (a
space used for recreation, business, and, some would say, religion)."57
The dispute in Viad Corp. v. Stak Design, Inc.58 was similar. The court was
asked to decide whether kiosks designed for displaying items for sale within a
preexisting structure could be protected as buildings under the AWCPA.59 Viad
sought to register the kiosks as architectural works, and the. Copyright Office
ruled against it, saying that a structure within a preexisting structure designed to
display items for sale could not sustain an architectural copyright claim. Viad
moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Copyright Office's definition of
"building" was too narrow, while Stak argued that it did not matter whether the
term "building" was ambiguous because Congress did not intend to include all
three-dimensional structures within the AWCPA.60
art' because buildings are excluded from VARA).
5 See Pollock, supra note 32, at 875-76 (noting that the new legislation raised questions about
the protectability of a variety of structures).
5 Intervest Constr. v. Canterbury Estates Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d 914 (11th Cir. 2008)
(involving plans depicting four bedroom homes).
52 Chirco v. Rosewood Village, L.L.C., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43748 (ED. Mich. 2005),
accepted, in part, rejected, in part, Chirco v. Rosewood Vill., L.L.C., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70197
(ED. Mich., Sept. 28, 2006) (considering infringement of condominium complex design).
53 Shine v. Childs, 382 F. Supp. 2d 602 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (litigation over designs for skyscraper
to be built on the World Trade Center site).
5 Hunt v. Pasternack, 192 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 1999) (dispute over designs for an "Organ Stop
Pizza" restaurant large enough to hold a "Mighty Wulitzer" organ).
ss See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
56 14 F. Supp. 2d 154 (D. Mass. 1998).
5 Id. at 159. Notwithstanding this denial of protection to a structure-within-a-structure, the
court found that defendant had infringed the plaintiff candle store's floor plans. Id. at 161. The
case was eventually settled and the opinion vacated. 29 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D. Mass. 1998).
58 No. 6:04-CV-407, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6572 (ED. Tex. Apr. 14, 2005).
5 Id. at *2.
60 Id. at *2-4.
2010] 11
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The court, noting the Yankee Candle opinion's question about whether
Fenway Park would be denied protection because it lacked a roof over the
diamond, decided that the term "building" was ambiguous. 61 However, it then
determined that Viad's contention that the term included any three-dimensional
object that could be used by humans was too broad and would strip the word
"building" of any meaning if adopted.62  The court concluded that the
Copyright Office's definition of building, "demarcating those structures that
may be occupied from those that may not," is reasonable.63 As a result, Viad's
kiosks were not copyrightable as architectural works.M
In contrast, the court in Moser Pilon Nelson Architects v. HNTB Corp. held that
a new parking garage for Central Connecticut State University was a
copyrightable building.65 The plaintiffs, who lost a public-bid competition to
design the garage, alleged that the defendants, who were the winning bidders,
had modified plaintiffs' design for the facility and submitted it as their own.66
The court did not accept the defendants' argument that the garage was not a
building within the meaning of the AWCPA since it was not meant for use by
humans as a place to socialize, work, relax, and linger.67 It agreed that the
garage was not habitable in the same manner as a house, but said that it was
permanent, stationary, and as much designed for human occupancy as a garden
pavilion.68 After all, visitors to the university leave their cars there all day, they
can obtain food at the vending machines, and it protects them and their cars
from the elements. Moreover, the defendants' theory, which attempted to
restrict the category of protected structures on the basis of the duration of
human occupancy, strained the ordinary meaning of the terms "building" and
"occupancy." "Congress would [not] have wished to protect an architect's
design of a home but not of an adjacent garage that was designed as an integral
part of the homeowner's property."69
In Patriot Homes, Inc. v. Forest River Housing, a dispute between manufacturers
of modular housing, the narrow issue for the court was whether Patriot's Elite
Modular design was a building under the AWCPA.70 The defendant argued that
the exclusion of mobile homes in the Copyright Office's regulations meant that
61 Id. at *7. The court questioned in a footnote how Texas Stadium, a structure with a hole in
the roof, would fare under the several definitions of "building." Id. at *7 n.4.
62 Id. at *8.
63 Id. at *9.
6 Id. at *9-10. The court declined to resolve whether the Copyright Office interpretation of
the term "building" was entitled to Chevron deference or the less-deferential Skidmore standard, but
said that the regulation was reasonable even under Skidmon.
65 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1085 (D. Conn. 2006).
66 Id. at 1087.
67 Id. at 1091.
68 Id. at 1092.
69 Id. at 1091.
7o 548 F. Supp. 2d 647, 649 (N.D. Ind. 2008).
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modular homes could not be protected. The court disagreed and explained that
mobile and manufactured homes were different from modular homes.
Plaintiffs units were clearly buildings because they were permanent and
stationary shelters designed to be used as dwellings, with or without a
permanent foundation. They had to meet building code requirements, and were
not built on a chassis like a mobile or manufactured home.71 Moreover, the
Elite Modular's floor plan was copyrightable because "the overall form displays
a creative arrangement of rooms in various sizes designed to be an affordable
and practical option for living headquarters." 72
For the most part, these decisions, determining what is and is not a
"building" for purposes of protection under AWCPA, make sense. However, I
disagree with the determination in Yankee Candle that a structure within a
structure is not a protectable building. It is reasonable to envision modular
structures, like those held to be protectable in Patriot Homes, designed as homes
or places of business, being placed inside a much larger structure. Still, even
though the Copyright Office regulations, which are entitled to at least Skidmore
deference, provide considerable guidance, it seems likely that in the future there
will be occasional disputes as to whether a particular structure falls within the
scope of the AWCPA. However, in the vast majority of the cases discussed or
cited in this Article, there was no dispute over whether the plaintiff's structure
was a building protected by the AWCPA.
B. MUST THE BUILDING BE CAPABLE OF CONSTRUCTION?
Well before the passage of the AWCPA in 1990, courts had held that
copyright protection extended to simplified floor plans, brochures with floor
plans, promotional materials, and cut sheets of copyrighted architectural plans.73
It did not matter whether an experienced contractor might have been able to
construct a house based on a brochure with simple floor plans and a rendering
of the finished house, because pre-AWCPA cases did not demand
constructability while affording copyright protection to such works of
authorship. Similarly, there is nothing in the AWCPA stating or implying that
copyright in an architectural work can subsist only in a work that has been
71 Id. at 651.
72 Id
73 John Wieland Homes and Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Poovey, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1929, 1933
(W.D.N.C. 2004) (citing Donald Frederick Evans & Assocs., Inc. v. Continental Homes, Inc., 785
F.2d 897, 904-05 (11th Cir. 1986), Imperial Homes v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 1972),
and Arthur Rutenberg Corp. v. Parrino, 664 F. Supp. 479, 481 (M.D. Fla. 1987)); Kent v. Revere,
229 U.S.P.Q. 828, 832 (M.D. Fla. 1985) (brochures with floor plans contained sufficient
information for residential designer to produce technical drawings). See also Herman Frankel
Organization v. Tegman, 367 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (defendant building company and
draftsman admitted copying copyrighted abridged floor plans alone from brochure constituted
violation of Copyright Act).
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constructed, 74 or that only designs capable of construction are copyrightable as
architectural works.75 In short, it does not matter whether a building depicted
in plans has been constructed or can be constructed in order for the plans to be
protected as an architectural work.76 After all, an architectural work is the
design of a building as embodied in a building, plans, or drawings.77 An
unconstructed architectural work, embodied only in plans, drawings, or models,
can be infringed by a completed structure embodying or depicting the protected
design.78
For example, in Shine v. Childs the court said it was irrelevant whether a
skyscraper for the World Trade Center site could be constructed from the
plaintiffs highly-acclaimed designs, renderings, and models.79 The court said
that the Second Circuit "[had] twice noted that plans or designs not sufficiently
detailed to allow for construction still may be protected" and that "[t]his
reasoning should apply equally to architectural works because [they are
generally] subject to the same standards that apply to other copyrightable
works."80
The decision in Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxuy Ventures8' is similar. The court
did not accept the defendant's argument that plaintiffs plans for a high-rise
building were unprotectable because they were too conceptual, consisted of no
more than commonly-used functional features, and lacked floor plans, site plan
74 Hunt v. Pastemack, 192 F.3d 877, 879-80 (9th Cir. 1999) (appellate court admits confusing
matters in an earlier decision and says that the statute makes clear that protection is not limited to
building designs embodied in constructed buildings).
75 Shine v. Childs, 382 F. Supp. 2d 602, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("The [AWCPA] nowhere states
or implies that only designs capable of construction are worthy of protection.").
76 Hunt v. Pastemack, 192 F.3d 877, 879 (9th Cit. 1999) (finding defendants liable for using
plaintiffs copyrighted plans for a restaurant even though the building depicted in those plans had
not been constructed). See also Louis Altman, Copyn~ght on Architectural Works, 33 IDEA 1, 61
(1992) (it is not a defense that the defendant took less than all that is in plaintiffs plans and did
not use the rest-the material taken does not have to be a large part of the plaintiff's work);
Pollock, supra note 32, at 881-87 (general discussion of the scope of exclusive rights in
architectural works).
77 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (definition of "architectural work"). See also T-Peg, Inc. v. Vermont
Timber Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 109 (1st Cir. 2006) (a completed building or structure can itself
constitute an infringing copy of a copyrighted work). The plaintiff designer in the T-Peg litigation
ultimately failed to prove at trial that the defendant builder copied its plans. T-Peg, Inc. v.
Vermont Timber Works, Inc., 2010 Copyright Law Decisions 1 29,990 (D.N.H. 2010).
78 Hunt v. Pasternack, 179 F.3d 683 (9th Cit. 1999), amended by, 192 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 1999);
Allora, L.L.C. v. Brownstone, Inc., No. 1:07CV87, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31343 (W.D.N.C. Apr.
27, 2007) (defendant's unauthorized use of plaintiffs copyrighted architectural plans to construct
homes outside geographic restrictions where designs could be used and in advertising and real
estate listings was actionable, but the court refused to enjoin construction because plaintiffs
damages remedy was adequate).
7 382 F. Supp. 2d at 609.
80 Id. at 608 (citing and quoting from Attia v. Soc'y of the N.Y. Hosp., 201 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir.
1999) andSparaco v. Lawler, Matusky & Skelly Eng'rs, LLP, 303 F.3d 460, 469 (2d Cit. 2002)).
81 469 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (S.D. Fla. 2006), affd, 527 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2008).
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dimensions, and indicators of site support.82  The court said that no
constructability test exists, that plaintiffs use of convex and concave segments
was distinctive in relation to other aspects of his design, and that his
arrangement and use of elevator towers was original and concrete.83 Since it is
possible to afford protection to plans depicted in a promotional brochure, it is
reasonable to afford protection to an architectural work depicted in an
architect's rendering of a new building contained in a bid proposal.M
An important caveat in regard to the issue of protecting works that might
not be capable of construction is that constructability is not the same as
copyrightability. Plans which are preliminary and generalized, and which
describe a proposed design at a very general level of abstraction, may contain
little more than unprotectable ideas, and thus may be entitled to very limited or
even no protection.85 For instance, "the concept of using an island-or
peninsula-shaped bar to bisect a seating area which has booths on one side and
stool seating on the other" for part of a restaurant's interior plan is a general
idea that is not copyrightable.8 6  Similarly, in litigation over a substantial
addition to a major New York City hospital, the plaintiff claimed that his
copyright on preliminary drawings extended to the placement of the addition
over FDR Drive, the use of a three-story high truss to transfer weight, the
insertion of a connecting roadway between 68th and 70th Streets, and the
placement of the mechanical floor in the same location in the new building.87
82 Id. at 1162. The plaintiff alleged that the high-rise condominium complexes of Trump
Palace and Trump Royale infringed his plans. Id. at 1159.
83 Id. at 1165-66. Nevertheless, the court granted summary judgment for the defendants
because no reasonable jury could find that their buildings were substantially similar to plaintiffs
designs. Id. at 1172. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 527 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2008). See also T-
Peg, Inc. v. Vermont Timber Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 114-15 (1st Cir. 2006) (reversing
summary judgment for defendant and explaining that the question was not whether plaintiff
created a completed frame design but whether a jury could conclude that defendant's frame for a
house, as drawn and built, was substantially similar to plaintiffs architectural work as embodied in
preliminary plans for a person's house); Lindal Cedar Homes, Inc. v. Ireland, No. 03-6102-TC,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18878 (D. Or. Sept. 14, 2004) (denying summary judgment against
defendant who allegedly based plans for custom home on one page from plaintiffs plan book).
84 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
85 Attia v. Soc'y of the N.Y. Hosp., 201 F.3d at 55 (plaintiffs preliminary drawings for
modernizing hospital were not infringed by defendants' detailed schematic design drawings which
incorporated several of the same design ideas and concepts).
8 Ale House Mgmt., Inc. v. Raleigh Ale House, Inc., 205 F.3d 137, 143 (4th Cir. 2000).
Decisions from before the passage of the AWCPA made the same point. For instance, the
concept of a T-shaped building is not copyrightable, but detailed plans and drawings for a specific
structure are entitled to protection. Nucor Corp. v. Tennessee Forging Steel Serv., Inc., 476 F.2d
386, 390 (8th Cir. 1973).
87 Atia, 201 F.3d at 55-56. Cf Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky & Skelly Eng'rs, LLP, 303 F.3d
460, 468-69 (2d Cir. 2002) (distinguishing Attia and holding that plaintiffs site plan for an
assisted living facility was sufficiently concrete and detailed to be entitled to copyright protection).
But tf Grusenmeyer & Assocs. v. Davison, Smith & Certo Architects, Inc., 212 Fed. Appx. 510
(6th Cir. 2007) (affirming trial court's grant of summary judgment where plaintiffs site plan was
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The court said that these elements were no more than ideas and concepts that
could not be protected by copyright.88
There is not a constructability test for protecting an architectural work, but
it is necessary for the architect's work product to be more developed than
general ideas and concepts. This requirement is not unique to architectural
works. After all, Section 102(b) states that protection for an original work of
authorship does not "extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."89
III. COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP ISSUES
Disputes about the ownership of copyrighted plans and blueprints were
litigated prior to the enactment of the AWCPA9O and they will continue to be
hotly contested. The AWCPA does not address copyright ownership, but the
standard American Institute of Architecture (AIA) contract provides that "the
architect shall be deemed the author of the documents and drawings prepared
with respect to [a particular] project and shall retain all rights to said documents
including copyrights."9' The standard contract also provides that the
documents and drawings "shall not be used by the owner or others on other
projects, for additions to this Project or for completion of this Project by
others, unless the architect is adjudged to be in default under this agreement,
except by agreement in writing with appropriate compensation to the
Architect."92 This language is clear but disputes still arise frequently over
ownership of the copyright in plans and versions of plans modified and used by
clients or builders without the architect's permission. 93
not sufficiently unique to merit copyright protection and where, in the alternative, use of the plan
was authorized under a contract).
88 Altia, 201 F.3d at 56.
89 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
90 See, e.g., Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr., 542 F. Supp. 252 (D. Neb.
1982). The defendant paid the plaintiff for its architectural service, then decided to use the plans
to build a second apartment complex without the plaintiff firm's consent or knowledge. The
court determined that the plans were not a commissioned work and that plaintiff had not
transferred copyright ownership to defendant, resulting in victory for the plaintiff.
91 Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 497 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Abbreviated Form of
Agreement Between Owner and Architect, art. 6, § 6.1).
92 Id. (italics removed).
93 See, e.g., Christopher Phelps & Assocs. v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532 (4th Cir. 2007); Zitz v.
Pereira, 119 F. Supp. 2d 133 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), afd sub nom., Richard J. Zitz, Inc. v. Pereira, No.
99-9399, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 26392 (2d Cir. Aug. 31, 2000), and 232 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2000)
(ownership dispute regarding plans to several townhouses resolved against copyright claimant
because it was determined he was not the author of the plans and the AWCPA was not applicable
since townhouses were under construction prior to Act's effective date); Johnson v. Jones, 149
F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 1998); Watkins v. Chesapeake Custom Homes, 330 F. Supp. 2d 563 (D. Md.
2004) (builders modified their copyrighted plans to reflect owners' revisions; owners then
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For example, the defendant in Christopher Phelps & Associates v. Galloway
wanted to build an upscale retirement home on Lake Wylie near Charlotte,
North Carolina.94 He saw a house he liked on Lake Norman, about thirty miles
away, and asked the builder for a copy of the plans.95 The builder advised the
defendant to ask the homeowner who, thinking that she had rights in the plans
because she had commissioned and purchased them, gave them to the
defendant on the condition that he not build his home on Lake Norman.96
Each page of those plans had a copyright notice and the name of the plaintiff
architect.97 The architect eventually sued for copyright infringement and won.9 8
The Lake Norman home owner might have owned a copy of the plans, but the
copyright on the plans was retained by the plaintiff architect.99
Similarly, in Johnson v. Jones the owner and the architect could not agree on all
the terms of a contract for the design and construction of the owner's dream
home, even after the architect started work on the project.1oo The draft
contracts had the standard AIA language about ownership of plans and
copyright.101 The owner eventually fired the architect, hired another architect
and builder, and gave the original architect's plans to his construction agent
who used them to build the dream house.102 The court held that this was
copyright infringement. 0 3
The basic rule remains as it was before the passage of the ACWPA:104 absent
an agreement to the contrary, the architect holds the copyright to the
architectural work prepared for the client. 05 In addition, courts are fairly
registered copyright on these plans and sued builders for infringement, but builders won on
summary judgment because the owners' plans, as derivative works, did not qualify for copyright
protection and owners failed to show that the builders had copied their work). Cf Javelin Invs.,
L.L.C. v. McGinnis, No. H-05-3379, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21472 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2007)
(plaintiff builders invoked several contradictory theories of ownership in plans drawn by nonparty
architect against building owners; court ruled in owner's favor, dismissing builder's claims).
94 492 F.3d 532, 535 (4th Cir. 2007).
95 Id
96 Id. at 536.
9 Id.
98 Id. at 536, 547.
9 Id. at 547. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (stating that ownership of copyright is distinct from
ownership of tangible object).
1-o 149 F.3d 494, 497 (6th Cir. 1998).
101 Id. at 497-98.
102 Id. at 499.
103 Id. at 507.
104 See, e.g., Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252 (D.
Neb. 1982); see also Shipley, supra note 1, at 400-01 & n.37 (discussing Aitken and noting court's
conclusions that the plans were not a commissioned work, that there was no work-for-hire
relationship because architect was an independent contractor, and that there was no joint
authorship).
105 See, e.g., Watkins v. Chesapeake Custom Homes, L.L.C., 330 F. Supp. 2d 563 (D. Md. 2004).
In their contract, the builders/architects modified plans to reflect homeowners' wishes. The
homeowners' copyright registration falsely asserted that the plans were based on plans that were
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reluctant to conclude, in situations like those in Johnson and Phelps &
Assodates,0 6 that the client, a rival architect, or a builder has an implied, non-
exclusive license to use the original architect's plans. In cases where courts have
determined that an implied license exists or plausibly may exist, the plaintiff
architect/copyright owner was found to have intended that his or her
architectural work be used in the manner in which it was eventually used. 07
The plaintiffs in Johnson and Phelps & Associates never intended for their plans to
be used without their involvement, consent, and compensation.'o8
An implied license was found in I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver,'0 9 where two
construction companies created a joint venture, I.A.E./BI, which was hired
to design an air-cargo hangar at the Gary, Indiana airport."0 They retained
Shaver, an architect, to create schematic documents for the first phase of this
multi-stage project; he signed a contract stating that he would do this for
$10,000."' Shaver created the schematics, delivered them to I.A.E./BI, and
was paid.112 He was hoping that he would be retained to work on the remaining
phases, but I.A.E./BMI hired another architect to finish the project and Shaver
mailed I.A.E./BMI an acknowledging letter that he was no longer involved.113
His schematic documents, along with a message conveying his hope that "the
ideas and knowledge exhibited in [the] work ... assist the Airport," were
enclosed with that letter.114 The I.A.E./BMI venture eventually sought a
declaratory judgment that it had not infringed any copyrights held by Shaver,
and that it had a right to use his drawings."15 The trial court agreed with
I.A.E./BMI, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Based on the written contract
describing the work to be done, Shaver's clear intent in his letter to I.A.E./BMI
that his schematics be used for the first phase of the project and the fact that
Shaver had received payment for his services, it was reasonable to conclude that
Shaver had granted an implied nonexclusive license to I.A.E./BMI." 6
used with the builders' permission. Summary judgment granted for builders/architects.
106 See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
107 Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d at 500-02 (discussing Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555
(9th Cit. 1990) and I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768 (7th Cit. 1996)).
108 Id. at 501; Christopher Phelps & Assoc. v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 535-36 (9th Cit. 2007).
See also Thomas M. Gilbert Architects, P.C. v. Accent Builders and Developers, L.L.C., 2010
Copyright Law Rescissions 1 29,927 (4th Cit. 2010) (builder's affirmative defense of implied
license properly dismissed).
1o9 74 F.3d 768 (7th Cit. 1996).
110 Id. at 770.
M Id
112 Id at 771.
113 Id
114 Id
"s Id. at 770-72.
116 Id. at 776-77. See also Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d at 501 (discussing I.A.E. Inc. v. Shaver);
Francois Assocs. Architects v. Jack Ruch Quality Homes, Inc., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1485 (C.D.
Ill. 2006) (court cites and discusses Shaver in deciding, based on invoices, conduct of the parties,
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R Miller Architecture, Inc. v. Edgington Enterterprises, Inc. is another case in
which a court said that the defendant, a construction company, might enjoy an
implied license to use the plaintiff architect's drawings.117 The defendant and
plaintiff had an informal work agreement for a 158-unit residential townhouse
community the defendant was constructing.'18 The defendant started to
experience financial difficulties, so the architect did only minimal work after a
certain point in time, and ultimately disassociated himself from the project."9
The architect was paid for his services, and several units based on his designs
were built.120 He then sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendant
from continuing to use his designs.121 The court concluded that plaintiff could
likely establish copyright ownership, but it denied injunctive relief, reasoning
that plaintiff architect had not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits because the defendant had several strong defenses, including an implied
license to use the plans.122 The court explained that the architect was hired in
1999 to create the designs at issue, that he delivered the designs to defendant
upon request, that he acknowledged in several letters between 2000 and 2005
that the designs would be distributed, that he did not include any warnings that
further use of the designs would be regarded as copyright infringement, and
that it was not until 2006 that the architect mentioned any limits on the use of
the drawings.123
The First Circuit, in affirming a district court's finding of sufficient evidence
of the plaintiff architect's intent to convey an implied nonexclusive license for
use of his plans, acknowledged that implied licenses are not common, that the
correspondence, and affidavits, that it could not yet say at this stage of litigation whether architect
plaintiff had granted implied license).
117 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 1819 (M.D. Fla. 2006).
"8 Id at 1820--21.
119 Id. at 1821.
120 Id. at 1822.
121 Id
122 Id. at 1823.
123 Id. at 1824. The court also said that the architect should have known of the alleged
infringement as early as 2001. As a result, his claim might have been barred by the doctrines of
laches and equitable estoppel as well as the statute of limitations. Id. at 1824-25. See aLso Jeffrey
A. Grusenmeyer & Assocs. v. Davison, Smith & Certo Architects, Inc., 212 Fed. Appx. 510, 514
(6th Cir. 2007) (defendant entitled to use plaintiff's master site plan for school expansion under
the contract between the plaintiff and the school); John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant
Props., Inc., 322 F.3d 26, 41-42 (1st Cit. 2003) (factors pointed away from an implied license
because the plaintiff had a long-term relationship with the developer of the site, the parties had
signed the standard AIA contract, and the alleged infringer had not obtained the plans from the
supposed licensor); Foad Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Musil Govan Azzalino, 270 F.3d 821, 832 (9th
Cir. 2001) (applying California law in finding that initial contract between defendants and
"plaintiff engineering firm" granted defendants an implied license to copy and adapt the firm's
plot plan and to publish the resulting derivative work for construction of project for which it was
designed).
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burden of establishing the license rests on the party alleging its existence, and
that the determination of intent is key.124 The considerations include:
(1) whether the parties were engaged in a short-term discrete
transaction, as opposed to an ongoing relationship; (2) whether the
creator utilized written contracts . .. providing that copyrighted
materials could only be used with the creator's future involvement or
express permission; and (3) whether the creator's conduct during the
creation or delivery of the copyrighted material indicated that use of
the material without the creator's involvement or consent was
permissible.125
The court of appeals, agreeing with the district court, concluded that the facts
favoring the existence of an implied license were compelling.126
As noted above, the AWCPA does not address copyright ownership issues.
These issues were litigated prior to 1990 and will continue to be contested. 27
IV. SATISFYING THE ORIGINALITY REQUIREMENT
What does it take for an architect's design to be protected by copyright?
Some of the cases discussed in this Article's first section indicate that a designer
has to go beyond general ideas and general concepts, while other cases hold that
protection would be afforded to rudimentary plans and renderings in
promotional brochures.128 How can these decisions be reconciled? What does
it take to secure copyright protection for an architectural work?
Assuming fixation of the architect's work in plans, a model, a sketch, or
some other tangible form,129 the basic question is what constitutes an original
architectural work. The Supreme Court stated that
[t]he sine qua non of copyright is originality. To qualify for
copyright protection, a work must be original to the author.
124 Estate of Hevia v. Portrio Corp., 602 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2010).
125 Id. at 41 (quoting Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., L.L.C., 284 F.3d 505, 516 (4th
Cir. 2002)).
126 Id
127 Disputes can arise even after litigation. For example, in Thomsen v. Famous Dave's ofAmeica,
Inc., 606 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 2010), Famous Dave's hired a contractor to design the d6cor for
several restaurants, but there was a dispute about ownership of those designs. The parties
resolved that dispute through settlement in 2001, with the contractor releasing all copyright,
proprietary designs, and sign work to the restaurant chain. Id. at 907-08. The contractor sued the
chain in 2007, alleging copyright infringement, and the district court interpreted the 2001
settlement in the restaurant's favor, holding that the contractor had transferred the design. Id. at
906, 908. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 912.
128 See supra notes 73-89 and accompanying text.
129 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
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Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the
work was independently created by the author (as opposed to
copied from other works) and that it possesses at least some
minimal degree of creativity. To be sure, the requisite level of
creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.130
Another way to approach this issue is to assume that the architectural work
owes its origin to its architect (that it was not copied)31 and ask what in the
work constitutes the modicum of creativity that must be present in order for
the work to be protected.
Consistent with Feist, "not much" creativity is required of the architect. The
Copyright Act's definition of architectural work states that protection does not
extend to individual, standard features, but that it does cover the overall form
of the work as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements
in the design.132 This means that an architectural work includes the design's
overall form, the arrangement and composition of the spaces in the design, and
the arrangement and composition of the design's elements minus the individual
standard features like "common windows, doors, and other staple building
components." 33
The AWCPA's legislative history explains that the phrase "arrangement and
composition of spaces and elements in the design" found in the definition of
architectural work recognizes that creativity in an architect's design often
includes "[the] selection, coordination, or arrangement of unprotectible
elements into an original, protectible whole," and the incorporation of "new,
protectible design elements into otherwise standard, unprotectible building
features." 134  It also acknowledges that "interior architecture may be
protected."13
This language about selecting, coordinating and arranging is similar to the
Copyright Act's definition of "compilation" as "a work formed by the
collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected,
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole
constitutes an original work of authorship."136 The requisite creativity for a
compilation, like a directory or taxonomy, may come from the author's choice
of materials to include in the work, the order in which the information is
130 Feist Pub., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (citations omitted).
131 Id. at 346 (citing Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884)
(defining "author" as "he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker")).
132 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (definition of architectural work).
133 Newsam, supra note 31, at 1115, quoJing H.R. REP., supra note 10, at 18.
134 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (definition of "architectural work").
135 H.R. REP., supra note 10, at 18.
136 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "compilation"). See also id. § 103(b) (copyright in a
compilation extends only to the material contributed by the author, as opposed to preexisting
material employed in the work).
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placed, or the manner in which data are arranged within the work.137 Sweat and
elbow grease alone do not satisfy the creativity requirement.138 Moreover,
"selections and arrangements that are mechanical, routine, common place,
typical, garden variety, obvious, inevitable, time-honored, age-old, or dictated by
law will fail to pass muster."139  Finally, the scope of protection for a
compilation is limited to the material contributed by the author and does not
extend to the preexisting material employed in the work.140 Protection for
compilations is often described as "thin."141
According to Judge Stanley Birch of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, the requisite creativity for architecture to be copyrightable is
analogous to that required for a compilation; the architect's selection,
coordination, or arrangement of the standard features may, together, constitute
a protectable whole.142 The case in which Judge Birch made this statement
involved litigation over floor plans for residences with four bedrooms. 143
Although the plaintiffs architectural work was found to be copyrightable, the
trial court said that given the dissimilarities with respect to the coordination of
non-original, commonplace, and elementary components, no reasonable
observer could conclude that the works were substantially similar.144 The court
of appeals upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the
defendant, holding that there was no infringement and noting that when the
scope of copyright protection is thin, the substantial similarity inquiry is
narrowed.145 In essence, the copyright on the plaintiffs architectural work was
good but quite limited; the offending work had to be virtually identical to the
plaintiffs work in order to be deemed infringing.
Another recent Eleventh Circuit decision on architecture infringement says
that when identifying the protected elements in an architectural work a court
has to be mindful of the basic principle codified in Section 102(b): that
protection does not extend to ideas, but to expression.146 The court also noted
that the AWCPA excludes individual standard features such as common
137 Feist, 499 U.S. at 348.
138 Id. at 352-56 (rejecting "sweat of the brow" approach).
139 David E. Shipley, Thin But Not Anorexic. Copynght Potection for Compilations and Other Fact
Works, 15 J. INrELL. PROP. L. 91, 98 (2007).
140 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2006).
141 Feist, 499 U.S. at 349 ("[C]opyright in a factual compilation is thin."); Shipley, supra note 139,
at 96.
142 Intervest Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Estate Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d 914, 919 (11th Cir. 2008).
143 Id.
144 Id. at 918.
145 Id at 919, 921 (citing Key Pub. Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ'g Enter., 945 F.2d 509, 514
(2d Cir. 1991)). See general4 Shipley, supra note 139.
146 Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1224-25 (11th Cir. 2008). See
also Ale House Mgmt. v. Raleigh Ale House, Inc., 205 F.3d 137, 143 (4th Cir. 2000) (general
concept of using an island or peninsula-shaped bar to bisect seating area in a restaurant not
entitled to copyright protection).
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windows, doors, and other staple building features from protection. 147 At the
same time, the court said that creativity in architecture often involves the
selection, coordination, or arrangement of unprotectable elements into a
protectable whole, and that the statute itself defines an architectural work as
"the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design." 48
Many other courts have said essentially the same thing: the copyrightability
of plans "is in the selection of its elements and in the coordination and
arrangement of those elements into a design."149 The existence of common,
unprotectable design features in a building's design does not preclude the
design as a whole from securing copyright protection. 50 Plans or architectural
works using features common in the building industry can constitute original,
protectable works when one considers the plans or the building as a whole and
the ways in which the architect combines the unprotectable elements.15
Similarly, although aspects of a particular style of architecture may be
unprotectable as standard features or under the scenes a faire doctrine, the
architect's combination of the style's standard elements or features can possess
the requisite originality to be deemed a copyrightable work.152
As with other works of authorship, an architect who, with permission of the
copyright owner, makes sufficient changes to an existing architectural work to
create a second architectural work is entitled to copyright protection on the new
structure or set of plans. The new architectural work constitutes a derivative
work.153 The same holds true for an architect who makes substantial enough
147 Oravec, 527 F.3d at 1225 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 and H.R. REP. NO., supra note 10.
'48 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "architectural work") and T-Peg, Inc. v. Vermont
Timber Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 110 (lstCir. 2006)). See also Miller's Ale House, Inc. v. Boynton
Carolina Ale House, L.L.C., 2010 Copyright Law Decisions 1 29,984 (S.D. Fl. 2010) (floor plans
of new restaurant chain did not infringe an established chain's plans because architectural works
are accorded only thin protection for their overall arrangement of common elements and
defendant's plans were not substantially similar).
149 Lindal Cedar Homes, Inc. v. Ireland, No. 03-6102-TC, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18878, at *6
(D. Or. Sept. 14, 2004) (noting that the AWCPA did not apply because the plaintiffs Parkside
model was designed, and largely constructed, before 1990, but also noting that the new law did
not affect protection of plans as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works).
150 Id.
151 Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (even though colors
themselves are not copyrightable, the architect's selection, coordination, and arrangement of color
may be protectable).
152 See, e.g., id at 1286; Trek Leasing Inc. v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 8 (Fed. Cl. 2005).
153 See, e.g., Tiseo Architects, Inc. v. SSOE, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 735, 738-39 (E.D. Mich. 2006)
(considering defendants' argument that plaintiffs copyright on its "Chilson Commons" design
for a commercial development anchored by a large grocery was invalid because it was not
sufficiently different from the plaintiffs design for a similar development in another township,
but ruling that differences were great enough that summary judgment could not be granted);
Richmond Homes Mgmt. v. Raintree, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1517, 1520-21 (W.D. Va. 1994)
(plaintiffs "Louisa" model was found to be derivative of the plaintiffs "Heritage" model with
enough significant variations, especially as to the exterior, to be copyrightable); Undal, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18878, at *10 (a defendant who, without permission, uses plaintiffs abbreviated
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changes to the design of a public domain architectural work. His or her
derivative work should be copyrightable. 54
Ordinarily, it should be relatively easy for an architect to satisfy the
originality requirement in designing an architectural work. However, the scope
of copyright protection for plans and the building constructed from those plans
will be quite limited for many architectural works. This is because most
buildings are functional. Moreover, because the protection of architectural
works is analogous to the protection afforded compilations, the scope of
copyright protection for many architectural works will be relatively thin.155 As
explained in the following sections, ordinarily only a limited number of
elements in an architectural work are protected by copyright and almost
verbatim copying must be established in order to succeed in an infringement
suit.156
V. INFRINGEMENT OF ARCHITECTURAL WORKS
A. THE BASICS
To prevail [in a copyright infringement claim], plaintiff must
prove "(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of
constituent elements of the work that are original." To prove
copying of original elements of his work, in addition to showing
originality, plaintiff must demonstrate both that defendants
actually copied his works, and that such copying was illegal
because there is substantial similarity between [his work] and the
alleged infringing "work."'57
Assuming ownership of a valid copyright, 5 8 the essential elements of the
claim that the plaintiff must prove are that the defendant copied his work and,
drawings from promotional literature to prepare more detailed plans and to construct a home
from those plans, prepares a derivative work and thus infringes).
154 See supra notes 129-48 and accompanying text.
155 Theresa V. Casey, Copynght Protection for "Green Design" of Architectural Works: Beyond
Functionalty, I LANDSLIDE 48, 49 (May/June 2009) (citing Feist Pub'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servs.
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991)). See general Shipley, supra note 139, at 140-41.
156 See infra notes 302-46 and accompanying text.
157 Shine v. Childs, 382 F. Supp. 2d 602, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Feist Pub'n, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)).
158 As discussed earlier, ownership can be hotly contested. See, e.g., Rottlund Co. v. Pinnacle
Corp., 2004 WL 1879983 (D. Minn. 2004) (magistrate concludes plaintiff owned copyrights
notwithstanding defendants' arguments that he had committed fraud on the Copyright Office); T-
Peg, Inc. v. Vermont Timber Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 101-02 (1st Cir. 2006) (the parties
disagreed about authorship and whether T-Peg or Timberpeg East was the copyright owner, and
thus had standing to sue-the appellate court reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment to defendants); Richard J. Zitz, Inc. v. Pereira, No. 99-9399, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
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if so, that he copied more than the law allows-that there is substantial
similarity of protected expression.5 9 How an architect plaintiff can establish
copying of his or her architectural work will be covered first, followed by
considerably longer discussion of the challenges involved in proving substantial
similarity of protected expression. The latter issue turns on defining the scope
of copyright protection for a protected architectural work. Scope issues are
discussed in a later section of this Article. 160
Copying can be established by direct evidence, but when that is lacking,
proof often focuses on showing that the defendant had access to the plaintiffs
work and that the works are substantially, or probatively, similar.161 Access may
be established by showing that the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to
view the plaintiffs work. This is said to mean that it was "reasonably possible
that the paths of the infringer and the infringed work crossed."162
For example, in Shine v. Childs, the defendants conceded that Childs had
access to plaintiffs designs and models for two skyscrapers because he
evaluated them as part of a jury at the Yale School of Architecture.163 This, in
turn, meant that plaintiff Shine had to show similarities between his works and
defendants' Freedom Tower that were probative of copying.'T M The court
concluded, after hearing from the parties' experts, that there was a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether defendants had copied plaintiffs design for one
of his skyscrapers, called Olympic Tower.165 The court then turned to an
22418, at *14 (2d Cit. Aug. 31, 2000) (plaintiff was not sole author of plans nor was he joint
author, and the drafting did not qualify as a work for hire); Beckwith Builders, Inc. v. Depietri, 81
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1302 (D.N.H. 2006) (significant disagreements over plaintiff's right to sue for
copyright infringement and other related claims). See also supra notes 90-127 and accompanying
text.
159 Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc. 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1992). See general# JOYCE ET AL.,
supra note 14, at 644--50.
160 See Section VI, Scope of Protection, infra notes 259-301 and accompanying text.
161 Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579, 581-83 (4th Cir. 1996); Plan Pros, Inc. v. Zych Constr., 2009
Copyright Law Decisions 1 29,870, at 42,167 (D. Neb. 2009).
162 Tower, 76 F.3d at 582. See Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1253 (11th Cir. 2007)
(summary judgment for defendant Disney because there was no admissible evidence that Disney
had access to artist's rendering of an international theme park, and Disney had evidence of
independent creation); Scholz Design, Inc. v. Larue, No. 4:06-CV-1600-RSW, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 62154, at *10 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 14, 2008) (summary judgment for defendant because
plaintiff could not show anything beyond the bare possibility of access); Rottlund, 452 F.3d at 731
(plaintiff entitled to summary judgment on issue of access because defendants had a reasonable
opportunity to view his technical drawings, and there were disputed issues of material fact as to
the total look and feel of the drawings at issue). See also Alan Latman, 'Probative Similariy" as Proof
of Copying: Toward Dipelhng Some Myths in Copynght Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1194-95
(1990).
163 382 F. Supp. 2d 602, 611-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
164 Id.
165 Id at 612.
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analysis of whether there was substantial similarity of protected expression, and
ultimately denied defendants' motion for summary judgment. 66
In general, the plaintiffs "burden is not to disprove the possibility of
independent creation, but instead to show similarities between [the plans at
issue] which are probative of copying." 67 For instance, in Lombardi v. Whiteball
XII/IHubert Street, the defendants argued on their motion for summary judgment
that the plaintiff could not prove actual copying because all the elements of
their building alleged by the plaintiff to have been copied from his plans were
not original but were instead elements of an adjoining building owned by one of
the defendants.' 68  The plaintiff testified to the contrary regarding the
similarities between his design, the defendant's building, and the adjoining
structure.' 69 The court concluded that there were disputed issues of fact and
that a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff on the issue of actual
copying.170
If the plaintiffs proof of access is weak and the similarities between the
architectural works in dispute go only to general design ideas and concepts, then
there is a good chance that the plaintiff will lose at an early stage of the
litigation. For instance, in Ale House Management v. Raleigh Ale House, Inc.,71 the
Fourth Circuit, affirming a trial court's determination that the plaintiff had
failed to make out a prima facie case of infringement, said that comparing the
restaurants' respective floor plans showed "at most, the imitation of an idea or a
concept, but not a copying of the plans themselves. Raleigh Ale House's floor
plans are not in the same dimensions or proportions as any of those presented
by AHM."172 The court noted that the closest similarity between the plans was
166 Id. at 615-16 (the court found a lack of probative similarity between plaintiffs Shine '99 and
defendants' proposed Freedom Tower, but concluded that reasonable jurors could disagree as to
substantial similarity between plaintiff's Olympic Tower and defendants' Freedom Tower); qC
Plan Pros, Inc. v. Zych Construction, 2009 Copyright Law Decisions 29,870, at 42,167 (D. Neb.
2009) (court assumed defendant construction company had access to plaintiff's plans, but denied
summary judgment because there were genuine issues of material fact as to independent creation
and substantial similarity of the respective plans); Jack Preston Wood: Design, Inc. v. B.L.
Building Co., No. H-03-713, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30511, at *30 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (side-by-side
comparison of plans shows they are uncannily similar so as to preclude the possibility of
independent creation by defendant, and partial summary judgment for the plaintiff was
appropriate because no reasonable juror could find to the contrary).
167 Lombardi v. Whitehall XII/Hubert St. L.L.C., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1151, 1162 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
168 Id.
169 Id
170 Id. See also T-Peg, Inc. v. Vermont Timber Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 115-16 (1st Cir. 2006)
(reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant because the issue of
whether defendant timberframe company's shop drawings and constructed frame were
substantially similar to plaintiff corporation's architectural work, as embodied in plans for the
homeowner's home, was one for the jury to decide after trial).
171 205 F.3d 137 (4th Cir. 2000).
172 Id. at 143.
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the "concept of using an island- or peninsula-shaped bar to bisect a seating area
which has booths on one side and stool seating on the other."17 3 According to
the court, this similarity was nothing more than an unprotectable idea.174
Moreover, the size and proportions of the seating areas, the locations of pool
tables, and the dimensions of the bars were different. These determinations,
coupled with lack of probative evidence of access, warranted affirming the
lower court's finding of no infringement. 75
Where the plaintiff cannot show access, he still may be able to establish
copying by showing that his original work and the alleged infringing work are
"strikingly similar." This means that the similarities are so strong as to preclude
the possibilities of independent creation, coincidence, or prior common
source. 7 6 Convin v. Walt Disney Company makes clear that this is a substantial
hurdle for the plaintiff.'77 In this case, the plaintiff represented the estate of a
deceased artist who painted a rendering of a concept for an international theme
park in miniature. 78 The artist had painted the rendering at the request of
Robert Jaffray, who had viewed miniature villages overseas and then developed
a concept that "entailed cities, villages, and landscapes representing nineteen
nations from six continents." 7 9 The plaintiffs claim was that Jaffray used the
artist's rendering in making a presentation of his concept for a theme park to
Disney officials in the early 1960s, and that Disney based EPCOT on the artist's
illustration after rejecting Jaffray's proposal; Disney denied that there had ever
been a meeting with Jaffray.180
The trial court granted summary judgment for Disney, and the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed because the plaintiff had no admissible evidence to
demonstrate that Disney had access to the painting, and Disney presented
evidence of independent creation.18 Moreover, the plaintiff failed to raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to striking similarity because there was no
showing about the originality of the deceased artist's arrangement of elements
or how the expressive elements of that arrangement were duplicated by
EPCOT or renderings of EPCOT.182 In addition, there were significant
173 Id
174 Id. (calling the feature a "mere concept" and thus not copyrightable).
175 Id. at 144. See also La Resolana Architects, P.A. v. Reno, Inc., 555 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2009)
(bare possibility that defendant developer had access to plans that plaintiff had allegedly faxed to
firms with which the developer had no contact was not sufficient to establish access, and
developer's plans for housing complex were not strikingly similar to plaintiff's plan; trial court
credited the testimony of the defendant's president over that of the plaintiffs president).
176 Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1253 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Selle v. Gibb, 741
F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984)).
177 Id
178 Id. at 1243.
179 Id
180 Id. at 1244.
181 Id. at 1253.
182 Id
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differences between the works, including the appearance of the globe, the
location of pavilions, the route of the rail system, and the level of detail of the
villages.183
It is important to recognize that plaintiffs alleging infringement of their
architectural works have lost at the pleading stage and on motions for summary
judgment. The Second Circuit has said that it is appropriate for a district court
to consider the question of non-infringement on a motion to dismiss. The
plaintiffs complaint must state a claim that is plausible on its face, and it may be
appropriate for the trial court to make a determination of substantial similarity
on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.'1
[W]here, as here, the district court has before it all that is
necessary to make a comparison of the works in question, we see
no error in the district court's decision to resolve the question of
substantial similarity as a matter of law on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss.'85
The flip side also is possible; summary judgment for the plaintiff architect is
available and appropriate where the degree of substantial similarity is
overwhelming-where no doubt exists that the offending structure is a
knockoff. 86
B. INFRINGEMENT BY THE REPRODUCTION OF PLANS
Assuming an architect's plans are copyrightable, and that ownership and
copying are established, it has long been settled that unauthorized reproduction
of plans constitutes infringement.'8 7 The enactment of the AWCPA did not
183 Id. at 1253-54.
194 Peter F. Gaito Architecture, L.L.C. v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2010).
185 Id.
186 Axelrod & Cherveny, Architects, P.C. v. T. & S. Builders, Inc., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1088
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (undisputed that defendants copied plaintiffs' sales literature and contracts; the
court determined that defendants' design was substantially similar to plaintiffs' design as
embodied in those materials and that the external facades of several of the homes were
substantially similar); Alexrod & Cherveny Architects, P.C. v. Winmar Homes, 2007 WL 708798
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (summary judgment granted for the plaintiff because the fronts of the two
homes were virtually identical and the blueprints showed that both homes had nearly identical
interior layouts); Nilson v. McGlaughon, No. 2:02-CV-54-BO(1), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30357
(E.D.N.C. Mar. 19, 2004) (granting summary judgment for plaintiff when defendant had access to
the plans and plans were substantially similar to those used to build the house); Bonner v.
Dawson, No. 5:02CV00065, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19069 (W.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2003) (granting
summary judgment for plaintiff where defendant had "the opportunity to view or copy the
copyrighted material and where there were only minor differences in the designs of the two
buildings").
187 See, e.g., Kent v. Revere, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 828 (M.D. Fla. 1985) (floor plans on plaintiffs
copyrighted brochure available at model home show copied by defendant and used to produce
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change things in this regard, as illustrated by Precision Craft Log Structures, Inc. v.
Cabin KIt Co.'8 8 Precision Craft designs and manufactures log homes, and it
registered plans for its Ponderosa and Silver Creek homes with the Copyright
Office as architectural works.189 Precision Craft learned that Cabin Kit was
displaying identical renderings of these homes on its website under different
names, and that it had sold several exact copies of the standard plans for each
model. Precision Craft sued for infringement and won.190 This would have
been an easy case prior to 1990 and it remains a straightforward case today.
C. REVISION OF PLANS AND THE SECTION 120(B) LIMITATION
The unauthorized revision of protected plans to adapt them for use in a
somewhat different structure can constitute infringement of the copyright
owner's right, enumerated in Section 106(2),191 to prepare derivative works.192
In order to be successful, the plaintiff must show, as in any infringement action,
that there is substantial similarity of protected expression.193
In UIndal Cedar Homes, Inc. v. Ireland the plaintiff owned copyrights on home
designs and sold home packages, combining the home designs and building
materials, through a network of dealers. 194195 A prospective customer obtained
technical drawings for builder); Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1972)
(using floor plan in advertising brochure to reproduce floor plan from plaintiff's copyrighted
drawings); Herman Frankel Org. v. Tegman, 367 F. Supp. 1051, 1052 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (creating
floor plans for defendants' home using the plaintiffs copyrighted abridged floor plans).
188 No. CIV 05-199-S-EJL, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3829 (D. Idaho Jan. 17, 2007).
189 Id. at *2.
190 Id. Cf Architects Collective v. Tannenbaum Group, CCH Copyright Law Decisions
29,972 (W.D. Ok. 2010) (architect's state law conversion claim, alleging defendant real estate
development company copied drawings, preempted because it is the same as a copyright
infringement claim).
191 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006).
192 See, e.g., Christopher Phelps & Assocs. v. Galloway, 492 F.3d. 532, 538 (4th Cir. 2007)
(finding that trial court's instruction regarding the scope of the plaintiffs copyright on slightly-
modified house was erroneous, and noting that where author of derivative work also has a
copyright on the underlying work there is no need to protect the author of the underlying work
because the entire work is that of a single author); Thomas M. Gilbert Architects, P.C. v. Accent
Builders & Developers, L.L.C., 629 F. Supp. 2d 526 (E.D. Va. 2008) (summary judgment for
plaintiff after defendant took plans the plaintiff had modified at defendant's request, removed all
references to plaintiff in those plans, modified them, and then used the plans to complete a
townhouse project; court also held that this defendant's copying and modification was not a fair
use and that defendant's copyright misuse defense lacked merit); Lifetime Homes, Inc. v. Walker
Homes, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1320, 1325 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (finding that copying took place
when defendants revised the original plans; court ultimately held for the defendants on the basis
that the designs were not substantially similar).
193 Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442-43 (9th Cir. 1994) (describing
the substantial similarity requirement).
194 No. 03-6102-TC, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18878 (D. Or. Sept. 14,2004).
195 Id.
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one of plaintiffs plan books of designs from a dealer and gave a page from that
book to the defendant builder.196 The builder then prepared construction plans
and built a home for that customer. Lindal sued for infringement, alleging that
this home was substantially similar to one of its copyrighted designs.197 The
builder moved for summary judgment on several grounds, including a
contention that the page it used from plaintiffs plan book as the basis for
construction plans contained merely unprotected ideas.'98 The court denied the
motion while stating that "as to all of defendnat's [sic] arguments, when a
defendant uses a plaintiffs abbreviated drawings from promotional literature to
prepare derivative works, i.e., more detailed plans, and to construct a home
from those plans, it can constitute infringement."' 99
In Dalton-Ross Homes, Inc. v. Williams, the plaintiffs copyrighted plans for its
VDM model were used by defendant with permission for defendant's Link and
Conway homes, and then without permission for its Latrobe home.200
Defendants admitted that they based their plans for the Latrobe home on the
unregistered plans for the Conway home, so the court's analysis focused on
comparing the plans for the defendant's Latrobe model with the plans for
plaintiffs copyrighted VDM model. It concluded the plans showed little
similarity: there was no breakfast nook in the Latrobe; the master bedroom in
the Latrobe had several features not found in the VDM; the layouts of the
living rooms were different; the fireplaces were in different locations; and, "the
size, type, and arrangement of rooms; the placement of various components
within each room; as well as the 'expression of the VDM plans, taken as a
whole'. .. [were] vastly different." 201  The court held that there was no
infringement of plaintiffs copyright on the plans for its VDM model, even
though the defendant's home was based on plans for a home which was, in
turn, derived from plaintiffs copyrighted plans.202
The copying and revision of plans in connection with the remodeling or
alteration of an existing building would seem to be a violation of the copyright
owner's right to prepare derivative works. However, this kind of revision of
plans may not constitute infringement due to an important limitation on the
protection afforded architectural works. Section 120(b) of the Copyright Act
states:
196 Id. at *1.
197 Id. at *2.
198 Id. at *3 .
19 Id. at *10. See also Jack Preston Wood: Design, Inc. v. B L Bldg. Co., No. H-03-713, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30511, 30 (S.D. Tex. June 22, 2004) (side-by-side comparison of plans shows
they are uncannily similar so as to preclude the possibility of independent creation).
2 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1953, 1954 (D. Ariz. 2007).
201 Id. at 1956.
202 Id
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Alterations to and destruction of buildings. Notwithstanding the
provisions of section 106(2) [the right to prepare derivative
works], the owners of a building embodying an architectural work
may, without the consent of the author or copyright owner of the
architectural work, make or authorize the making of alterations to
such building, and destroy or authorize the destruction of such
building.203
According to the AWCPA's legislative history, this provision is intended to
prevent the architect/copyright owner, who holds the exclusive right to prepare
derivative works, from interfering with alterations to a habitable architectural
work.204 One scholar explained that "Congress correctly viewed alteration and
destruction of a building by its owner to be practical necessities.. . . In order to
perform its utilitarian functions, a building must be able to adapt and change.
Conditioning changes on the approval of the original architect may lead to
frustrating delays."205
Reported cases in which Section 120(b) has been applied and discussed are
rare. In one case, the plaintiff architect claimed infringement of his plans on
the ground that the owners of the home depicted in those plans would have
copied the plans and modified them when they remodeled their house.206 The
court did not accept this argument because it undermined Section 120(b).207
The court explained that copying of plans could be inferred in almost any
renovation project absent complete demolition of the structure and
[t]hus, home alteration projects would almost always be
vulnerable to challenge on grounds that the original plans must
have been copied. If such challenges were permitted, then
section 120(b) would fall far short of its intended purpose "to
permit the owners of buildings to do whatever they want" with
their buildings. 208
203 17 U.S.C. § 120(b) (2006).
20 H.R. REP., supra note 10.
205 Raphael Winick, Note, Copyight Protection for Architecture After the Architectural Workr Copyight
Protection Act of 1990,41 DUKE L.J. 1598, 1622-23 (1992). See aho Shipley letter, supra note 13, at 3.
206 Javelin Invs., L.L.C. v. McGinnis, No. H-05-3379, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21472, at *2-5
(S.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2007).
207 Id. at *34.
208 Id. (quoting Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990: Hearing on H.R. 3990
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Admin. of justice of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1990)).
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The court concluded that the alteration safe harbor in Section 120(b) had to
permit copying and modification of the plans "else its protections would be
rendered largely nugatory." 209
D. UNAUTHORIZED USE OF PLANS
Are plans infringed by construction of the building they depict? Ordinarily,
it is reasonable to assume that protected blueprints would have to be
reproduced in order to construct the building depicted therein, but it is possible
for a builder to construct the building without reproducing the plans. Before
the passage of the AWCPA, a number of courts and commentators asserted
that the completed structure was not a copy of the plans and that the copyright
on the plans did not include a right to control use; there was not a right to
build. 210 "So long as the putative infringer copied the building, rather than the
plans for the building, no liability would attach." 211 One court stated:
Whether or not the construction originally "flowed from" infringing
copies of [plaintiff's] plans . .. is immaterial. Construction of a
building imitating that depicted in copyrighted architectural plans
does not, consistent with [Baker v. Se/den, 101 U.S. (11 otto 99)
(1879)], constitute infringement of those plans. Although individuals
are not free to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted
architectural plans, they remain free to duplicate houses depicted in
those plans unless and until the designs embodied in such plans are
secured by patent.212
The AWCPA changed this. As originally drafted, the bill referred only to
architectural works as embodied in buildings, and there was a concern
209 Id. The architect's claim of copyright infringement was barred by the AWCPA. The court
distinguished Guillot-Vogt Assocs. v. Holly & Smith, 848 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. La. 1994) because it
did not involve an architectural work but engineering drawings for the mechanical and electrical
portions of a construction project. These drawings were protected as pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works and Section 120(b) was not applicable. Id.
210 Shipley, supra note 1, at 403; LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 132-33. See also Demetriades v.
Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp. 658, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Muller v. Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F.
Supp. 298, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). But see Niemi v. NHK Spring Co., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d 1766, 1768
(N.D. Ohio 2007), afd in part, rev'd in part, 543 F.3d 294 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing several cases
decided before 1990 for proposition that construction of the object depicted in drawings or plans
infringes but also citing ACWPA's definition of architectural work).
211 Newsam, supra note 31, at 1078-79.
212 Demetriades, 680 F. Supp. at 666. See also Robert R. Jones Assocs. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d
274, 280 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying pre-AWCPA law and saying that one may construct an identical
home to one depicted in plans, but one may not directly copy plans and then use infringing plans
to construct the home); De Silva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184, 198 (M.D. Fla. 1962)
(unanimous view that the architect does not have exclusive right to build structures embodied in
his technical writings).
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expressed that this would allow a defendant with access to plans to construct an
identical building but escape liability so long as the plans were not copied.213 To
close this gap in protection, the definition of architectural work was expanded
to include a building's design "as embodied in any tangible medium of
expression." 214
Notwithstanding the definition of "architectural work" and this legislative
history, some confusion remained about unauthorized use, as opposed to
unauthorized reproduction, of plans. For instance, the plaintiff in Eales v.
Environmental Lifestyles, Inc. discovered that her plans were used without her
permission to build a home in Scottsdale, Arizona; she registered her copyright
on the plans, sued for infringement, and won.215 There is nothing especially
remarkable about this outcome given the passage of the AWCPA, but the
appellate court, before affirming the judgment, made the following incorrect
statement in a footnote:
Because this case involves a claim of infringement of copyrighted
plans, not a structure, the Architectural Works Protection Act of
1990 .. . is inapplicable. See 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 2.08[D]2, at
2.114 n.163.4 ("The Architectural Works Protection Act ... does
not affect protection for architectural plans, drawings and models
as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works."). 216
This should have been an easy case because it appeared that the defendant
had infringed by reproducing the plaintiffs plans, 217 but the court confused
things by saying that the AWCPA was inapplicable to plans. The Ninth Circuit
stated in a subsequent decision that the Eales court should not have suggested
that copyright in an architectural work can subsist only in a work that has been
constructed, that this was inaccurate dicta, that later versions of Nimmer's
treatise discussed the court's error, that it was clear from the statute that an
architectural work can be embodied in plans as well as a building, and that the
Eales case arose before the AWCPA was passed.218
213 H.R. REP., supra note 10.
214 Id. See also T-Peg, Inc. v. Vermont Timber Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 109 (1st Cir. 2006).
215 958 F.2d 876, 878-79 (9th Cit. 1992).
216 Id. at 880 n.2.
217 It appears from reading between the lines that the defendant must have reproduced the
actual plans the plaintiff submitted to the city's building department. Id at 878 (noting one
defendant's familiarity with plaintiffs plans and construction on a lot).
218 Hunt v. Pasternack, 192 F.3d 877, 878 (9th Cit. 1999). However, it was correct for the Eales
court to state that protection for plans and drawings as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works
under Section 102(a)(5) was not affected by the AWCPA. See, e.g., Guillot-Vogt Assocs. v. Holly
& Smith, 848 F. Supp. 682, 686-87 (E.D. La. 1994) (drawings and plans have long enjoyed
protection, and 1990 amendments to the Copyright Act provide previously lacking copyright
protection for architectural works). This means that there are now two separate copyrights: one
in the plans or drawings, and the other in the architectural work that is the design of the building
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Notwithstanding the confusion that might have been caused by the Eales
decision, it is now settled that plans can be infringed by constructing the
building they depict. For instance, in Christopher Phelps & Assoiates, LL C v.
Galloway, the defendant wanted to build an upscale retirement home on Lake
Wylie near Charlotte, North Carolina.219 He looked at completed homes about
thirty miles away on Lake Norman, just north of Charlotte, saw a house he
liked, and contacted the homeowner. This homeowner, thinking she owned the
plans on her Lake Norman house, consented to the defendant's use of those
plans so long as he did not build in the Lake Norman area.220 Even though
each page of the plans included a copyright notice and the name of the
plaintiff's architectural firm, the defendants used them to build the home at
Lake Wylie. Once the plaintiff learned that its plans were being used to
construct a home, it sued for copyright infringement and won.221
Some courts, however, seem to remain confused by the distinctions between
plans and renderings, and the building constructed from those plans and
renderings. These courts have failed to read the AWCPA's definition of
architectural work carefully.222 This confusion might result from decisions
holding that the unauthorized use of technical drawings to build a non-
copyrightable machine or device depicted in the drawings does not infringe.
The drawings are treated as pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, and the
design of a useful article like a machine is considered a pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural work only to the extent the design incorporates "features that can be
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the
as depicted in the plans or in a completed building. T-Peg, Inc. v. Vermon Timber Works, Inc.,
459 F.3d 97, 110 (1st Cit. 2006); Hunt v. Pasternack, 179 F.3d 683, amended, 192 F.3d 877 (9th
Cit. 1999); f Nat'l Med. Care, Inc. v. Espiritu, 284 F. Supp. 2d 424, 434 (S.D. W. Va. 2003)
(architect enjoined from reproducing manufacturer's copyrighted information, but actual medical
cabinets depicted in copyrighted drawings were highly utilitarian and could not be regarded as
infringing copies of the drawings).
219 492 F.3d 532 (4th Cit. 2007). See also supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
220 Christopher Phelps &Assos. LLC, 492 F.3d at 536.
221 Id. at 537. The jury awarded plaintiff $20,000. Most of this Court of Appeals decision is
concerned with the amount of the award, whether certain instructions to the jury were
appropriate, and whether injunctive relief should have been granted. The Fourth Circuit
ultimately affirmed both the verdict and the trial court's order refusing to enjoin the lease or sale
of the infringing home before remanding for consideration of whether the infringing plans should
be destroyed or returned to the plaintiff. Id. at 547. See also Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494 (6th
Cir. 1998) (architect and client unable to agree on contractual terms, architect learns client gave
the plans to construction agent who then used those plans to begin work on the project, district
court found copyright infringement and Court of Appeals affirmed).
222 See, e.g., Beckwith Builders, Inc. v. Depietri, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1302, 1312 (D.N.H. 2006)
(holding, as was the case before the passage of the AWCPA, that a building is not a copy of an
architectural plan; defendants, who were alleged to have built a particular home but not to have
copied plaintiffs plans, cannot be liable for infringing registered drawings but might be liable for
infringing architectural work).
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utilitarian aspects of the article."223 If the unauthorized use of the technical
drawings to build the machine or device they depict is found to infringe the
drawings, then the scope of copyright protection on the drawings has been
improperly expanded to reach the non-copyrightable machine.224  An
architectural work, however, in contrast to a machine or functional device like a
lawn mower or storage cabinets depicted in technical drawings, is copyrightable
under the AWCPA even though it is functional. 225
E. SECTION 120(A) AND UNAUTHORIZED PHOTOGRAPHS OF ARCHITECTURAL
WORKS
The AWCPA expanded copyright protection for works of architecture, but
these works do not really enjoy full copyright protection.226 As discussed
earlier, the portion of the Act codified at Section 120(b) limits the
architect/copyright owner's rights by providing that he or she cannot prevent
the alteration or destruction of a building by its owners.227 Section 120(a)
provides another limitation on an architect's rights in regard to a finished
structure:
Pictorial representations permitted. The copyright in an
architectural work that has been constructed does not include the
right to prevent the making, distributing, or public display of
pictures, paintings, photographs, or other pictorial
representations of the work, if the building in which the work is
embodied is located in or ordinarily visible from a public place.228
As applied, this limitation means that the architect/copyright owner would
not have an infringement claim against Architectural Digest for publishing
photographs of a house he or she designed, so long as the structure was visible
from a public place.229 The rationale for exempting pictorial representations is
that the right to exploitation of architectural works is not harmed by allowing
photographs and other representations. Architecture is a public art form, and
prominent works are often photographed by tourists, architects, architectural
22 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
224 Niemi v. Am. Axle Mfg. & Holding Co., No. 05-74210, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50153 (E.D.
Mich. July 24, 2006); Nat'l Med. Care, Inc. v. Espiritu, 284 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D. W. Va. 2003)
(copyright on technical drawings depicting medicine cabinets does not extend to the structures
built from those technical drawings).
225 17 U.S.C. § 101.
226 Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2000).
227 See supra notes 202-09 and accompanying text (discussing the application of 17 U.S.C. § 120(b)).
22 17 U.S.C. § 120(a).
229 Cf Landrau v. Solis Betancourt, 554 F. Supp. 2d 102, 110-11 (D. P.R. 2007). The magazine
article about the house also included photographs of the interior. The plaintiffs failed to allege
that the defendant either made the photographs or published them. Id. at 111.
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critics and others.230 In addition, magazine articles and books on architecture
routinely include photographs of structures.231 This is great publicity for
architects.
The best known case discussing this limitation on architectural copyright is
Leicester v. Warner Brothers.232 Andrew Leicester, an artist known for large scale
public art, was retained by R&T Development Corporation to create a
substantial artistic work that would become part of a new office building in
downtown Los Angeles, a twenty-four story architectural work called the 801
Tower.233  Leicester's work, tided Zanja Madre (Mother Ditch) told an
allegorical story of the history of the city and its dependence on water from the
mountains; he did this using a courtyard with a distinctive fountain from which
water flowed through a channel representing the city's source of water in its
early history.234 Inside the perimeter of the courtyard were, among other things,
two building towers and two towers with drill bits on top representing the city,
and five more towers and gates formed a wall and entrance to the courtyard and
the building.235 Leicester's contract with R&T gave it a license to make
reproductions of Zanja Madre in brochures, advertisements, catalogs, and
similar publications, and Leicester promised not to make any duplicate, three-
dimensional reproductions of the work.236
In 1994, Warner Brothers obtained permission from R&T to use the 801
Tower in filming "Batman Forever." Leicester and the building's architect were
not consulted. The building, serving as the Gotham City Bank, is shown in the
movie. Four of the distinctive towers in the streetwall portion of Leicester's
work appear in several scenes in the movie, but the rest of the Zanja Madre was
not in the film. 237 Leicester registered Zanja Madre with the Copyright Office
as a sculptural work and sued Warner Brothers for infringement.238 One of the
issues was whether the Section 120(a) exemption for pictorial representations of
architectural works applied to Warner Brothers' showing of Zanja Madre in the
movie.239
The trial court determined that R&T's agreement with Leicester did not give
it the right to sublicense Warner Brothers to make photographic or other
pictorial representations of Zanja Madre.240 However, it decided that the
Section 120(a) exemption was applicable because Leicester's lantern towers and
230 H.R. REP., supra note 10, at 22.
231 Id
232 232 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2000).
233 Id. at 1214.
234 Id
235 Id
6 Id. at 1215.
237 Id.
238 Id .
239 Id.
240 Id
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smoke towers had functional aspects designed to be part of the building, that
they matched up with the building's architecture, and that the artistic works at
the tops were incorporated in the tower's structure and design.241 In essence,
Leicester's artistic work was an integrated part of the architectural work.242 The
trial court also refused to treat Zanja Madre as conceptually separable from the
building, like a gargoyle or a stained glass window, because the intent of
Congress in enacting the AWCPA was to substitute a new kind of protection
for architectural works for the previous protection sometimes afforded non-
utilitarian sculpture incorporated into a building.243
The Ninth Circuit affirmed 2-1, with each judge writing an opinion. The
major point of contention was whether the AWCPA should be construed to
eliminate separate protection for sculptural works attached to buildings. Judge
Rymer's opinion said that the trial court's finding that Leicester's work was part
of the design plan for the building was well supported by the record.244 The
streetwall towers were part of the functional and architectural vocabulary of the
building, and not conceptually separable sculptural works entitled to copyright
protection.245 "Because the streetwall towers are part of the architectural work,§ 120(a) applies." 246
The plaintiff argued that Congress did not abolish protection for pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works incorporated in buildings when it enacted the
AWCPA. The court's response was that "[w]hether or not Leicester may have
some other claim for a different infringement of his copyright in the Zanja
Madre towers as a sculptural work, we believe he has none for a pictorial
representation of the 801 Tower and its streetwall embodying a protected
architectural work."247
Judge Tashima wrote a concurring opinion. He voiced disagreement with
the conclusion that Leicester's streetwall towers were not conceptually separable
from the architectural work, and agreed with the dissent's view that the lower
court found only that the four towers at issue were a portion of the architectural
work that included the building and the towers. 248 He also agreed with the
district court's conclusion that Section 120(a) protected Warner's pictorial
representation "in these factual circumstances, where a joint
architectural/artistic work functions as part of a building."249 The primary
focus of his concurring opinion was to explain that the protection of
241 Id
242 Id
243 Id
244 Id. at 1217-19.
245 Id. at 1219.
246 Id
247 Id. (emphasis omitted) ("Otherwise, § 120(a)'s exemption for pictorial representations of
buildings would make no sense.").
248 Id at 1221.
249 Id. at 1222.
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architectural works established by the AWCPA was now the exclusive remedy
for pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works embodied functionally in a
building.250 Otherwise, the Section 120(a) exemption would be meaningless for
that building if conceptual separability were applied. Judge Tashima believed
that this reading effectuated "Congress' intent to reject the conceptual
separability test as a device for determining the scope of protection for
architectural works." 251
Judge Fisher dissented because he believed that Leicester's towers could be
seen as conceptually separate from the building and thus entitled to full
protection as a sculptural work under Section 102(a)(5). His contention was
that the AWCPA did not eliminate separate protection for pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works that are part of, but conceptually separable from, an
architectural work.252 The opinion considered that the pre-AWCPA view was
that conceptually separable sculptural works on buildings were copyrightable,
that the AWCPA added protection for architectural works, that the AWCPA
should not be read as eliminating protection for sculptural works incorporated
in buildings, and that it would be odd to read the AWCPA as eliminating
protection when Congress, at the same time it enacted the AWCPA, expanded
protection for certain works of graphic and sculptural artists with the passage of
the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA).253 In the absence of statutory language
or clear legislative intent, Judge Fisher was unwilling to read the AWCPA as
making what he deemed to be a "drastic change in the law" with respect to
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.254 He would have remanded the case
for a thorough determination of conceptual separability.255 If Leicester's towers
were determined to be separable, then Warner's pictorial reproductions of them
would not be exempt under Section 120(a) but instead would be infringing.256
Judge Fisher's dissent is persuasive. VARA was enacted in the same year as
the AWCPA, and it grants authors of works of visual art the right to prevent
the destruction of a work of recognized stature.257 More on point, it has
sections dealing specifically with what should be done when a work of visual art
has been incorporated in a building such that it cannot be removed without
destroying or modifying the work, and the owner of the building wants to alter
or tear down the building.258 These provisions benefit both artists seeking to
protect their rights and building owners attempting to notify these artists of
25 Id at 1223-24.
251 Id at 1224 ("[I]t gives meaning and substance to the pictorial representation exemption ...
252 Id.
253 Id. at 1226-27.
254 Id at 1235.
255 Id
256 Id
2 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (2006).
2 Id § 113(d)(1), (d)(2). See also H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 3 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915 (discussing works incorporated in buildings).
38 [Vol. 18:1
TWENTY YEARS OF THE A WCPA
proposed removals of their works, changes to the building, or both.259 When
VARA and the AWCPA are read together, it is reasonable to conclude that
Congress did not treat architectural works as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
works in order to avoid entangling these works in the judicial disagreement over
the separability test, but that it wanted qualifying works of visual art
incorporated into buildings to be treated as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
works that may or may not be physically separable from the copyrightable
architectural work.
VI. GENERAL SCOPE OF PROTECTION ISSUES
The unauthorized reproduction, revision, or use of plans or blueprints
presents a relatively simple infringement issue. If copyrighted blueprints are
reproduced, modified, or used without the copyright owner's permission, then
infringement has probably occurred. Though it is tempting to assume that
substantial similarity of protected expression should rarely be an issue, this
assumption is erroneous. An exact reproduction of plans ordinarily will
infringe, but what if the defendant architect or builder makes substantial
changes to the plaintiffs plans in order to satisfy his or her client's wishes, or
makes changes so that the building will be a better fit with the client's lot, or
both? In such a situation, there is copying, but is the defendant's building still
substantially similar? What if a client wants a new home designed in a particular
style-say, a Craftsman-style bungalow-and he takes his architect to look at an
already-constructed home in that style; will a new home that evokes the
Craftsman style of the existing home be regarded as substantially similar? Both
of these hypothetical scenarios involve questions about the scope of copyright
protection.
For purposes of these hypotheticals, assume that the plaintiff has established
copyright ownership,260 and that the defendant has copied the architectural
work, perhaps by having access to the plans, viewing the completed structure
(as in the above scenarios), or both. 261 The plaintiff has to prove that there is
substantial similarity of protected expression, 262 because liability turns on
259 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1), (d)(2). See also Shipley letter, supra note 13, at 3 (general comments
about architectural works and moral rights).
260 See, e.g., Richard J. Zitz, Inc. v. Pereira, No. 99-9399, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 22418 (2d Cit.
Aug. 31, 2000) (plaintiffs claims for infringement were dismissed because plaintiff was not the
author of plans submitted to Copyright Office and hence not copyright owner). Cf Peter F.
Gaito Architecture, L.L.C. v. Simone Dev. Corp., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1537, 1540-41 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
261 See David & Goliath Builders, Inc. v. Elliott Constr., No. 05-C-494-C, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 34991, at *6 (W.D. Wis. May 25, 2006) (comprehensive discussion supporting the finding
that defendant copied plaintiffs architectural work).
262 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991).
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whether there has been substantial reproduction of copyrightable material.263
The fact that a building is copyrighted as an architectural work does not mean
that every element is protected. The basic issues are what aspects or features of
an architectural work are protectable, and to what extent those features are
protected.264  Copying constitutes infringement when there is substantial
similarity between the defendant's work and protectable elements of the
plaintiffs work.265 Courts "have defined substantial similarity as existing 'where
an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been
appropriated from the copyrighted work.' "266 It is necessary to determine
" 'whether the similarities ... are substantial from the point of view of the lay
[observer] and whether those similarities involve copyrightable material.' "267
Another way to express this is to ask whether the intended audience will see
substantial similarities between the works.268 This is not easy. As Learned
Hand stated, "[t]he test for infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague." 269
Given the tremendous variety of works protected by copyright, and the
different ways in which works can be infringed, this is not surprising.270
Determination of what constitutes infringement of a protected work
requires careful analysis. There are two approaches followed by the courts in
regard to infringement generally, not just with respect to architectural works.
These are the subtractive, or analytical dissection approach, and the totality
approach. The goal of both is the same: "to determine whether the defendant
has appropriated an improper amount of the plaintiffs copyrightable
expression." 271
A. THE SUBTRACTIVE APPROACH
The subtractive or analytical dissection approach to the substantial similarity
inquiry consists of two steps. The first step is to identify which aspects of the
architect's work, if any, are protected by copyright. The second step, after
subtracting the unprotected aspects of the work, is for the fact-finder to
determine whether there are significant similarities between the protected
aspects of the plaintiffs work and the allegedly infringing work.272
263 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 14, at 647.
264 Neil Boorstyn, Copyright Law Reporter at 18 n.4 (CCH 2011).
265 Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 110 (2d Cir. 2001).
266 Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1224 (11th Cit. 2008) (quoting
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 829 (11th Cit. 1982)).
267 Id. (quoting Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm't, 193 F.3d 1241, 1248 (11th Cir. 1999)).
268 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 14, at 644.
269 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cit. 1960) (L. Hand.,
J.).
270 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 14, at 644-45.
271 Id. at 650.
272 Id. at 647.
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The first step requires excluding ideaS273 and those unprotectible elements
that fall under doctrines like scenes a faire.274 However, the risk of a rigorous
application of the subtractive approach is in missing the protectable forest for
the unprotectible trees, and in failing to recognize that there can be protectable
authorship in how an architect selects and arranges components and features.275
In this regard, the Copyright Act's definition of architectural work states that
protection does not extend to individual, standard features, but it does cover
the overall form of the work as well as the arrangement and composition of
spaces and elements in the design.276 Another way to say this is that an
architectural work includes the design's overall form, the arrangement and
composition of spaces in the design, and the arrangement and composition of
the design's elements, minus individual, standard features like "common
windows, doors and other staple building components." 277 This arguably means
that the sum of an architectural work can be greater than its constituent parts,
and that it would be a flawed analysis to assert that a work as a whole is
unprotectable because each of its elements is unoriginal.278 Moreover, given the
AWCPA's definition of architectural work, it would seem that an overly-
rigorous application of the subtractive approach that is too vigorous would be
improper because it arguably ignores the architect's copyrightable selection and
arrangement of unprotectible features. 279 The cases, discussed below, show that
this is easier said than done.
Once all of the unprotected aspects of the architectural work are excluded,
the second step in the subtractive approach is to determine whether the
remaining elements of the allegedly infringing work are substantially similar to
the protected elements in the plaintiffs work.280 This means that the court or
the jury must do a side-by-side comparison of the works to determine whether
the alleged infringing work is so similar to the plaintiffs work that an ordinary,
273 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991); Oravec v. Sunny Isles
Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1224-25 (11th Cir. 2008).
274 Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 1982),
superseded by statute on other grounds, Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (amended 1983). Scandia Down Corp. v.
Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423 (7th Cir. 1985) (recognizing that scenes a faire refers to incidents,
character, or settings which are, as a practical matter, indispensable, or at least standard, in the
treatment of a topic). The doctrine also encompasses elements that are dictated by external
factors. Computer Mgmt. Assistance Co. v. Robert F. DeCastro, Inc., 220 F.3d 396, 401 (5th Cir.
2000).
275 See, e.g., Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the way an
author puts together a number of unprotectable elements can be a protected work).
26 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). See also supra notes 132-52 and accompanying text.
277 Newsam, supra note 31, at 1115 (quoting H.R. REP., supra note 10, at 18).
278 Lombardi v. Whitehall XII/Hubert St. L.L.C., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1151, 1164 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
279 Id. See also Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad., Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 243 (2d Cir. 1983); Metca/f
294 F.3d at 1074.
280 Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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reasonable person (average lay observer) would conclude that the defendant
unlawfully appropriated the plaintiffs protected expression.281
If the alleged infringing structure does not utilize any protected aspects of
the plaintiffs structure, then there is no infringement. For example, a modest
ranch-style home will have protected and unprotected features, and a finding of
infringement would not be appropriate where the only similarities between the
plaintiffs work and the defendant's allegedly infringing home design are
unprotectable elements. 282 Copying a home's fagade, ornamental designs, and
distinctive color schemes might infringe, but infringement cannot be inferred
merely from the fact that the alleged infringing home has the same number of
bathrooms, a kitchen, a central staircase, and a garage, because these are
unprotectable standard features. 283
B. THE TOTALITY APPROACH
The totality approach adapts for litigation purposes the principle that
unprotected elements can be selected and arranged to create a copyrightable
work, and that infringement can be found when the plaintiffs work and the
alleged infringing work have the same concept and feel.284 A leading totality
approach case is Sid & Marty Kroft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.
in which the McDonaldland television commercials with Ronald McDonald and
Mayor McCheese were held to have infringed the plaintiffs H.R. Pufnstuf
television show. 285 The commercials and the show were not organized or
structured the same way, but they did have the same concept and feel in terms
of atmosphere and overall approach: both were set in imaginary worlds with
anthropomorphic plants, animals, and other creatures; both had the same
topographical features; and both had forests of talking trees and human faces.
In addition, the characters were similar, both works had mayors with large
281 Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 508-09 (7th Cir. 1994).
282 Trek Leasing, Inc. v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 8, 12 (Fed. Cl. 2005).
283 David & Goliath Builders, Inc. v. Elliott Const., No. 05-C-494-C, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
34991 (W.D. Wis. May 25, 2006) (finding disputed issues of material fact regarding whether
defendant copied fagade and floor plan of plaintiff's "Cobblestone Ranch" and whether interior
features of home and other building details were copied and therefore denying defendant's
motion for summary judgment); Home Design Services, Inc. v. David Weekley Homes, L.L.C.,
548 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1313 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (floor plans for single family residences were
generally similar but there were striking differences as to square footage, kitchens, number of
closets, location of sinks, and corridors separating fourth bedroom from family room).
284 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 14, at 648-49 (discussing Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co.,
429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970) and Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977)). See also Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533
F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1976) (here the works had a different feel but that court made the point that a
children's story whose sequence of events was not copyrightable could still be infringed by other
forms of inexact copying).
2 562 F.2d 1157.
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heads and wide mouths, "Keystone cop"-like characters, mad scientists, and
multi-armed evil creatures.286
Even though the Kroffl litigation would probably come out the same way if
the subtractive approach had been followed, the totality approach risks
overprotection, because in protecting a work's concept and feel, there is a risk
of improperly extending protection to ideas. 287 The totality approach " 'invite[s]
an abdication of analysis' because 'feel' can seem a 'wholly amorphous
referent.' "288 Moreover, not all aspects of a particular style or look are
necessarily entitled to copyright protection. For example, Frank Lloyd Wright
is associated with the Prairie School of architecture, and many of his works
have a particular look-many people can identify a Wright-designed home.
However, based on the AWCPA's legislative history, it is doubtful that
Congress intended to afford protection to the standard or common aspects of
the Prairie School style of architecture--elements of that look which might be
regarded as architectural scenes a faire. An architect should be able to evoke a
particular style or look without risking infringement, just as a painter ought to
work in the hard-edge style without infringing Piet Mondrian or Robert Indiana.
C. COMBINING THE APPROACHES
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit combined these two
approaches to substantial similarity analysis in Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures,
Inc., v. Einstein Moomy, Inc.289 The court acknowledged that the total concept
and feel standard alone might lead to erroneous protection of ideaS 290 and then
stated:
[O]ur caselaw is not so incautious. Where we have described
possible infringement in terms of whether two designs have or do
not have a substantially similar "total concept and feel," we
generally have taken care to identify precisely the particular
aesthetic decisions--original to the plaintiff and copied by the
defendant-that might be thought to make the designs
similar ... 291
286 Id. at 1167 n.9.
287 Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir.
2003).
288 4 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][1][c] (2003),
quoted in, Tufenkian, 338 F.3d at 134.
289 338 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2003) (involving the alleged infringement of plaintiff's carpet design
that combined two public domain designs).
290 Id. at 134.
291 Id
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The court went on to say that total concept and feel inquiry functions to
remind the court that although it is important to first dissect the plaintiffs work
into its component parts in order to determine what is not original,
"infringement analysis is not simply a matter of ascertaining similarity between
components viewed in isolation" because a work can be infringed by ways other
than verbatim copying.292 The competing works must be analyzed closely "to
figure out in what respects, if any, they are similar, and then determine whether
these similarities are due to protected aesthetic expressions original to the
allegedly infringed work, or whether the similarity is to something in the original
that is free for the taking." 293
It has been suggested that the Second Circuit's reintroduction of total
concept and feel, as limited by the necessary dissection of the plaintiffs work
into component parts in order to set the bounds of protected authorship,
should work with architecture. This is because much of what an architect does
involves selecting materials from the public domain and combining them to
create a copyrightable whole.294 There are several decisions, discussed in the
following subsections, that seem to apply this merged test. This test does not,
however, necessarily make the plaintiff architect's case any easier.
D. FUNCTIONALITY AS A LIMIT ON THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION
One of the reasons for treating architecture separately from pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works was to avoid entangling these works in the heated
disagreement over how to apply the separable and independent test to pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works embodied in useful articles. 295 Still, according to
the AWCPA's legislative history, functionality must not be ignored in evaluating
the scope of protection for architectural works.296 The House Report on the
AWCPA envisions a two-step process for determining functionality: first,
determine whether there are any original design elements, including the overall
shape and interior design; second, if there are original elements, then it is
necessary to determine whether those elements are functionally required. Only
those design elements not functionally required are protectable without regard
to physical or conceptual separability. Unlike industrial design, the aesthetically
pleasing overall shape of a structure can be protected.297 The House Report
contains the following explanation of this two-step analysis for determining the
scope of protection:
292 Id. (emphasis omitted).
293 Id at 134-35.
294 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 14, at 704 n.1.
295 H.R. REP., supra note 10, at 20 (discussing why architectural works were not placed under 17
U.S.C. § 102(a)(5)-the pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works category).
296 Id at 21.
2 Id. at 20-21. See also Newsam, supra note 31, at 1079.
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Functional considerations may, for example, determine only
particular design elements. Protection would be denied for the
functionally determined elements, but would be available for the
nonfunctional determined elements. Under such circumstances,
the Copyright Office should issue a certificate of registration,
letting the courts determine the scope of protection. In each case,
the courts must be free to decide the issue upon the facts
presented, free of the separability conundrum presented by the
useful articles doctrine applicable for pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works. Evidence that there is more than one method
of obtaining a given functional result may be considered in
evaluating registrability or the scope of protection.298
Thus, Congress provided some general guidance in the Copyright Act and
its legislative history about what should and should not be protected in an
architectural work, but it has otherwise left to the courts the determination of
the scope of protection.299 It is reasonable to speculate about whether this has
been easy for the courts. In a 1961 report, the Register of Copyrights
recommended against extending protection to the design of functional
architectural structures because of the difficulty of distinguishing between the
functional and artistic features of a design.300 Is it any easier for a court to
determine if a particular aspect of an architectural work is or is not functional
than it is for a court to resolve whether an artistic feature on a useful article, like
a belt buckle or a mannequin, is physically or conceptually separable?30
VII. As APPLIED-JUDICIAL RESOLUTION OF SCOPE OF PROTECTION ISSUES
A. RESIDENTIAL HOMES
Richmond Homes Mgmt., Inc. v. Raintree, Inc. has a thorough and relatively early
interpretation of the impact of the AWCPA.302 The parties were competitors in
the Charlottesville, Virginia housing market, and the claim was that the
298 H.R. REP., supra note 10, at 21.
2 LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 132; Newsam, supra note 31, at 1115. See also JOYCE ET AL., supra
note 14, at 644 ("The inability to be specific [about what constitutes infringement generally] is the
reason that Congress chose not to define infringement in the statute, but instead to leave the
matter to ad hoc determination by the courts.").
3 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM. 87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE
GENERAL REvISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw 15-16, reprinted in 2 Studies on Copyright 1199
(1961).
301 Newsam, supra note 31, at 1080. See, e.g., Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632
F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980); Pivot Point Int'l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913 (7th Cir.
2004).
302 862 F. Supp. 1517 (W.D. Va. 1994), af'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 66 F.3d 316 (4th
Cir. 1995).
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copyright on the plaintiffs architectural work, a residential home called the
Louisa, was infringed by the defendant's residential home called the
Rockford.303 There was substantial evidence of copying, and the exhibits
introduced at the trial showed that the Rockford interiors, and all of the
exteriors except one, were substantially similar to the Louisa. "The family room
[was] located in the same place, with virtually identical dimensions; door and
window placements [were] substantially similar, as [were] the location and sizes
of rooms and closets. On the exterior, to the untrained eye, the original
McCormick home and the Louisa were identical." 304
Regarding the validity and scope of the plaintiffs copyright in the Louisa
model, the court correctly noted that the level of originality required for
copyright is not high, that protection for an original house design is not
precluded because the design is utilitarian, and that although the underlying
unoriginal component parts of a creation are not subject to protection, the
creator's selection and arrangement of those parts may be original and
protectable. 305 The court explained that:
[b]y extending copyright protection to architectural structures ...
the [AWCPA] brought architectural structures within the
confines of existing copyright standards for creative works.
Thus, architectural works need no longer serve primarily
nonfunctional, creative purposes, akin to sculptures, but
protection extends to the most mundane, functional products of
modern commercial architecture so long as the minimal
originality requirement of copyright law is met. Now structures,
as well as plans, are subject to the same copyright protection.
Moreover, structures and plans, such as those of the Louisa, may
be protected irrespective of their functional purpose.306
These are expansive statements about the copyrightability of architectural
works, but they really do not say much about the scope of that copyright.
Moreover, defendant's Rockford model was very similar to the plaintiffs Louisa
model in both interior and exterior design. The homes appeared to be virtually
identical, and a customer who thought he had purchased the Louisa had in fact
purchased the Rockford. 307 Even a thinly-protected compilation is infringed
when an unauthorized reproduction is virtually identical.308 The subtraction and
303 Id. at 1520.
3 Id. at 1521.
3s Id. at 1523.
36 Id. at 1525 (citations omitted).
3 Id. at 1521.
308 See, e.g., Skinder-Strauss Assocs. v. Mass. Continuing Legal Educ., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 665,
673 (D. Mass. 1995) (plaintiff may have to show near identity between works); Apple Computer,
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totality approaches were not needed in this case because the defendant's
copying of plaintiffs architectural work was almost verbatim.
The compilation analogy has been used in other cases involving residential
homes and, as seen in the Richmond Homes litigation, the plaintiff often has to
show near identity between his architectural work and the defendant's in order
to succeed due to the thin scope of copyright protection.309 For example, in
litigation over plans for residences with four bedrooms, the dissimilarities
between the works with respect to how the parties had coordinated non-
original, commonplace, and elementary components caused the trial court to
decide that no reasonable observer could conclude that the works were
substantially similar. 310
The trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant was affirmed,
with the Court of Appeals noting that when the scope of copyright protection is
thin, the substantial similarity inquiry is narrowed.311 In essence, when
copyright on an architectural work is thin, the offending work has to be virtually
identical to the plaintiffs work in order to be deemed infringing. 312 The scope
of protection was thin because these were relatively simple architectural works
in which the plaintiff architect had coordinated unprotectable, commonplace
components to make a copyrightable whole. The authorship was in that
coordination of the elementary components but, once those components were
dissected out, there was not much creativity. Moreover, the defendant had
coordinated similar unprotectable components in a different way. In affirming,
the Eleventh Circuit expressed a preference for summary judgment in cases
involving protected and unprotected aspects because a judge understands the
dichotomy between ideas and expression, and appreciates that not all copying is
infringement.313
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1994) (virtual identity may have to be
shown).
3 See, e.g., Intervest Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Estate Homes, 554 F.3d 914 (11th Cir. 2008).
310 Id. at 918.
311 Id. at 919 (citing Key Publ'ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ'g Enters., 945 F.2d 509, 514
(2d Cir. 1991)). See generaly Shipley, supra note 139.
312 See Howard v. Sterchi, 974 F.2d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 1992) (although floor plans were
visually similar and the layouts generally the same, the dissimilarities such as roof lines, bay
windows, and dimensions were significant-the court noted that there are a limited number of
ways to divide a rectangle and stated that "modest dissimilarities are more significant than they
may be in other types" of works); Home Design Servs., Inc. v. David Weekley Homes, L.L.C., 85
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1889, 1894 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (citing Howard, 974 F.2d 1272 while noting
generally the same overall layout in the four bedroom, two bath homes, but finding striking
differences in floor plans and fa2cades, determining the absence of substantial similarity, and
granting summary judgment).
313 Intervest, 554 F.3d at 920.
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B. CONDOMINIUMS
The basic approach, involving identification of the protected components of
the plaintiff's and defendant's structures and then doing a comparison, has been
followed in litigation involving condominiums. For instance, in Chirco v.
Rosiewood Village, LLC,314 the court compared the plaintiffs' Aberdeen design
and the defendants' Rosewood Village design:
Both have an "H-shaped" footprint, twelve units arranged as four
first-floor and eight second-floor units, architectural fronts and
rears identical to each other, direct entry from the garage, etc....
In short, the designs share the same basic footprint and
configuration. However, there are substantial differences as well.
As shown by the overlays attached to Mr. Merz's affidavit, the
rooflines of the buildings, viewed from both the front and the
side, bear no resemblance whatsoever. Further, the facades of
the two buildings appear from the overlays to bear numerous
dissimilarities. In addition to the differing rooflines, the doors,
windows, chimneys, and balconies are placed differently. In
fact ... there is not a single door, window, or other aspect of the
Rosewood building that lines up with the Aberdeen building.. .
no reasonable fact finder could conclude based on a comparison
of the two designs as a whole that defendants' design is
"strikingly similar" to plaintiffs' design.315
The court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to produce sufficient
evidence on the questions of access and similarity to permit a rational finder of
fact to conclude that defendants had copied the plaintiffs' plans. It granted
summary judgment for the defendants. 316 Since there was weak evidence of
access and few similarities between the condominiums, there was no reason for
the court to worry about the subtraction test or the totality test; the plaintiff
failed to prove copying.317
The court also said that the required similarity analysis is conducted from
the perspective of the intended audience: "the lay public, in which case the
finder of fact's judgment should be from the perspective of the lay observer
or ... the reasonable person."318 This is also called the ordinary observer test:
314 No. 03CV72145DT, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43748 (E.D. Mich., Mar. 22, 2005).
315 Id. at *23--24.
316 Id. at *25-27.
317 Id. at *26.
318 Id. at *21 (quoting Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 857 (6th Cir. 2003)). The court later
reconsidered the grant of summary judgment for defendants, finding genuine issues of material
fact as to access, substantial similarity under the overall concept and feel test, and defendants'
independent creation of its designs. Case 2:03-cv-TR145-OPH, Document 195, filed September
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two works will be regarded as substantially similar where an ordinary observer,
unless he sets out to detect disparities, would be disposed to overlook them,
and regard the aesthetic appeal of the two works as the same.319
C. MORE COMPLEX STRUCTURES
There has been infringement litigation over complex structures like high-rise
buildings with residential and commercial space. In Peter F. Gaito Architecture v.
Simone Development Cop., the plaintiffs plans for the $175,000,000 Church Street
Project in New Rochelle, New York included a 3 4-story glass tower
condominium with 421 rooms, an eight-story mid-rise residential building, a
series of shops set in attached low-rise buildings at street level with 44,200
square feet of retail space, and other structural features.320 Even though the
plaintiff and defendant had worked together in bidding on this project before
the defendant terminated the relationship and hired another firm, and even
though there were many similarities between plaintiffs design and defendant's
re-design, the court dismissed the plaintiffs infringement claim because it did
not state a claim for relief that was plausible on its face. 321 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, saying it was proper for the district
court to make a determination of substantial similarity on a motion to
dismiss. 322
The plaintiffs alleged several similarities, like identical floor areas, number of
parking spaces, the provision of a public plaza, the use of public art, and the
orientation of the buildings to ensure water views. 323 The court said that but
for floor area and number of parking spaces, these features were common to
urban high-rise developments and could not be protected by copyright because
they were abstract ideas and concepts.324
In addition, the court carefully compared the respective designs:
Plaintiffs' design includes an apparently glass-roofed penthouse
extending for substantially the full length of the longer dimension
of the top of the building, whereas SLCE's re-design contains no
comparable superstructure. Plaintiffs' design includes vertically
28, 2006 (E.D. Mich.). See also Chirco v. Gateway Oaks, L.L.C., No. 02-CV-73188, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 43081 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 26, 2005) (same plaintiffs but different defendants, with
issues of fact as to substantial similarity between plans; court rules that plaintiffs Knollwood
building design is not entitled to copyright protection).
319 Lombardi v. Whitehall XII/Hubert St., L.L.C., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1151, 1163 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
320 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1537, 1538-39 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), afd, 602 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2010).
321 Id. at 1542.
322 Gaito, 602 F.3d at 69.
323 Gaito, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541.
324 Id
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spaced wave-like decorative ribbons extending across the broad
face of the high-rise building, whereas SLCE's re-design has no
similar ornamentation. In plaintiffs' design, the high-rise building
does not appear to have balconies on its broad side, whereas
SLCE's re-design includes balconies on the broad side at each
floor of the building.... The overall visual impressions of the
two designs are entirely different. No reasonable juror would be
"disposed to .. . regard their aesthetic appeal as the same." 325
Since there was no substantial similarity between the protectable elements of
the designs, the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim for copyright
infringement.326 Much of the Second Circuit's opinion, affirming the dismissal
of the complaint, focused on the propriety of resolving the issue of substantial
similarity of protected expression at the pleading stage without the aid of
discovery. 327 The court said that it was not required to dissect works into their
components and to compare only those elements that are copyrightable.
Rather, it was guided by comparing the total concept and overall feel of the
plaintiffs work with that of the defendant's allegedly infringing work. Here
it is patent that the overall visual impressions of the two designs
are entirely different.... Upon examining the "total concept and
feel" of the designs with "good eyes and common sense". . . we
confidently conclude that no "average lay observer would
recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the
copyrighted work."328
In affirming the dismissal in Gaito, the Second Circuit discussed its earlier
decision to affirm a summary judgment for the defendants in Allia v. Society of
the New York Hospital.329 In this opinion the court said that even if copying was
325 Id.
326 Id. at 1542.
327 Nothing in this opinion should be read to upset these
settled principles, or to indicate that the question of non-infringement is always
properly considered at the pleadings stage without the aid of discovery. But
where, as here, the district court has before it all that is necessary to make a
comparison of the works in question, we see no error in the district court's
decision to resolve the question of substantial similarity as a matter of law on a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
Gaito, 602 F.3d at 65.
328 Id. at 67. See also Lombardi v. Whitehall XII/ Hubert Street, L.L.C., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1151, 1164 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (the defendants' element by element approach, to support their
argument that plaintiffs work as a whole was unprotectable, was flawed; the court said it would
not dissect the works at issue into separate components and compared only the copyrightable
elements).
329 Gaito, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541-42; 201 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1999).
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assumed, the similarities between plaintiffs preliminary drawings and
defendants' schematic drawings were uncopyrightable ideas and concepts. 330
The project at issue in Attia was the expansion and modernization of New York
Hospital's facilities located at the edge of the East River and 68th Street in
Manhattan. One of the proposals called for the use of air rights over F.D.R.
Drive along the riverbank, and the plaintiff architect was hired to develop a
series of drawings and sketches to present the concept of constructing a new
building on a platform above the highway.331 The plaintiff was then asked to
work with one of the defendants, another architectural firm, to develop these
ideas, but the relationship terminated and the plaintiff was paid $500,000 for his
services.332 The hospital eventually initiated a competition to select the architect
who would design and build the project, and a joint venture that included the
firm that had worked with the plaintiff on the preliminary concept drawings was
selected.333
Several years later, after reading an article in the New York Times about the
plans, the plaintiff sued for infringement. The trial court, in granting summary
judgment for defendants, found that differences between the designs "embrace
what are indisputably basic features of hospital operation and logistics.
Discounting these features simply transforms plaintiffs work into an unrealized
concept or idea, and hence not copyrightable." 334 In affirming, the Second
Circuit stated:
The problem of distinguishing an idea from its expression is
particularly acute when the work of "authorship" is of a
functional nature, as is a plan for the accomplishment of an
architectural or engineering project. As a generalization, to the
extent that such plans include generalized notions of where to
place functional elements, how to route the flow of traffic, and
what methods of construction and principles of engineering to
rely on, these are "ideas" that may be taken and utilized by a
successor without violating the copyright of the original "author"
or designer.335
The plaintiff cited a long list of elements that the defendants had taken from
his preliminary drawings, such as placement of the building over F.D.R. Drive,
use of a three-story truss to transfer weight, insertion of a connecting roadway
between 68th and 70th Streets, and placement of the mechanical floor in the
330 Attia v. Society of the New York Hospital, 201 F.3d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1999).
331 Id. at 51.
332 Id. at 51-52.
333 Id. at 52.
334 Id at 53 (quoting from the trial court's memorandum order).
33s Id at 55.
512010]
J. INTELL PROP. L
same location in the new building.336 The court said that these elements were
no more than ideas and concepts. "We find no instance in which Defendants
have copied particularized expression that commands protection under the
copyright law."337 This is a variation on the merger of idea and expression
doctrine: there were several design problems (ideas) which had to be resolved in
order to meet the client's needs and demands, and most architects would have
handled these problems the same way (as there are a limited number of ways to
express these ideas).
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxuy Ventures, LC
came out the same way, affirming the grant of summary judgment for the
defendants.338 The plaintiff alleged that the Trump Buildings in Sunny Isles
Beach, Florida infringed his design for a high rise building featuring "the use of
alternating concave and convex segments and elevator cores protruding through
the building's roofline." 339 In particular, the plaintiff listed ten elements present
in both his design and the Trump Buildings:
(1) alternating concave and convex sections; (2) three prominent
elevator shafts that protrude above the roof of the building; (3)
rounded building ends; (4) constant radius curves; (5) holes in the
building; (6) a twin tower design; (7) see-through floor plans; (8) a
circular plaza; (9) a central fountain; and (10) a rooftop pool and
landscape elements.*34
The court of appeals acknowledged that the Trump Buildings also had
alternating concave and convex sections and three partially exposed elevator
towers extending above the buildings' rooflines, but proceeded to set forth a list
of dissimilarities that were evident from comparing the plaintiffs designs with
the defendants' buildings. 341 For example, the plaintiffs floor plan design
measured 320 feet long and 42 feet wide, with a 'banana shaped' curve, while
the plans for Trump Buildings had a more rectilinear shape and measured 260
feet long and 72 feet wide at their narrowest points. The designs of the
respective elevator towers were significantly different, and their tops were
sloped differently, so that the Trump Buildings' towers gave the effect of
smokestacks on a cruise ship, while the plaintiffs were horizontal on top.342
336 Id. at 55-56.
337 Id. at 56. But see Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky & Skelly Eng's, L.L.P., 303 F.3d 460, 468-69
(2d Cir. 2002) (distinguishing Ania and holding that plaintiffs site plan specified more than vague
general indications of shape and placement of elements and was thus copyrightable).
338 527 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2008).
339 Id. at 1220-21 (the Trump Buildings are the Trump Palace and the Trump Royale, twin high
rise condominiums).
34 Id. at 1225-26.
341 Id. at 1226-28.
342 Id. at 1226-27.
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Other elements identified by the plaintiff, such as rounded building ends, a
rooftop pool, and landscape elements, were treated by the court as either ideas
or individual standard features. Moreover, they were expressed differently in
the Trump Buildings.343
The court emphasized that the similarities were "only at the broadest level
of generality," and that to afford protection to the "concept of a
convex/concave formula or in that of using three external elevator towers that
extend above the roof ... would extend the protections of copyright law well
beyond their proper scope."344 Affording copyright protection to the plaintiffs
selection of design elements "would effectively bar all other architects from
incorporating these concepts into new and original designs."345 That result
would diminish the number of ideas and concepts available for future works.346
It is evident that the Eleventh Circuit broke the plaintiffs work down into
several components, explained how some aspects of the design were ideas or
design elements that other architects needed to use (arguably scenes afaire), noted
the many differences between the designs, and found that some features were
expressed much differently in the Trump Buildings. It concluded, on summary
judgment, that the plaintiff could not prove substantial similarity of protected
expression.
D. SUCCESS STORIES OR WITHSTANDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Given the limited scope of copyright protection for most architectural
works, it is reasonable to ask whether plaintiff architects can ever win, or at
least survive a defendant's motion for summary judgment, absent clear evidence
of almost verbatim reproduction of his or her design. The answer is "yes." It is
reasonable to infer, based on the decisions concerning infringement of designs
for a condominium complex, high rise buildings, and a large addition to a
hospital,347 that an architect who designs a fairly complex structure, like a
skyscraper, can tread close to infringement if he or she borrows too much.
Specifically, if his or her building goes beyond merely having similar elements to
those found in another architect's design, and uses similar concepts to give the
same overall visual impression as that other architect's building, there might be
infringement. In short, problems might arise if the respective designs for the
complex buildings have the same look and feel.
34 Id. at 1227.
3" Id.
34 Id at 1228.
34 Id The court also held that the plaintiff could not claim architectural work protection by
having registered his designs as a pictorial, graphic, and sculptural work. Id at 1231.
34 See supra notes 313-46 and accompanying text.
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Sturda v. United Arab Emirates is an interesting case involving complex
buildings with a similar look and feel.348 The plaintiff, Elena Sturdza, and one
of the defendants, Angelos Demetriou, entered designs in a competition held by
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for a new embassy and chancery. 9 The
UAE gave all competitors a program manual that specified certain requirements
and explained that it was seeking a " 'modern sophisticated multi-use facility
expressing the richness and variety of traditional Arab motifs.' "350 Sturdza won
the competition and, over the next two years, exchanged numerous contract
proposals with the UAE, but communications eventually broke down.35' About
a year later, Sturdza saw the design that the UAE had submitted to the National
Capital Planning Commission. She discovered that it was Demetriou's design,
but not the one he had initially submitted in the competition. She felt that he
had " 'copied and appropriated many of the design features that had been the
hallmark of her design,'" so she sued the UAE and Demetriou for copyright
infringement and other claims. 352
In reversing the lower court's grant of summary judgment for the
defendants, and concluding that Sturdza's claim of substantial similarity
presented genuine issues of material fact, the court of appeals repeated the
familiar general descriptions of the substantial similarity inquiry, brought out
that protection does not extend to scenes a faire,353 and said that the substantial
similarity determination requires comparison of the two works' individual
elements in isolation as well as their overall look and feel.354 It added that
summary judgment is traditionally frowned upon in copyright litigation.355
The court of appeals agreed with the lower court that the embassy's overall
volume, backyard garden, and atrium should be excluded from the substantial
similarity comparison along with elements like domes, wind-towers, parapets,
arches, and Islamic patterns, which amounted to unprotectable ideas in and of
themselves. 356 It also said that the Islamic patterns could be characterized as
scenes a faire, but added that Sturdza's expression of these elements was
protectable. 357
The district court had engaged in a careful comparison of the works and an
analysis of how Sturdza's and Demetriou's designs had used elements like
31 281 F.3d 1287, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
34 Id. at 1291-92.
35 Id at 1292 (quoting a letter from the UAE Ambassador).
351 Id.
352 Id. at 1292-93 (quoting Sturdza's first amended complaint).
353 Id. at 1295-96. These are incidents, characters, or settings which are, as a practical matter,
indispensable or standard in the treatment of a given topic. Computer program features dictated
by manufacturer design standards have been treated as scenes afaire.
35 Id at 1296 (citing Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001)).
355 Id
35 Id. at 1297.
357 Id
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domes, wind-towers, parapets, arches and Islamic patterns, and concluded that
the designs were "decidedly different."358  The court of appeals parted ways
with the lower court on this point. It believed the district court overlooked the
way in which the defendant's design expressed architectural concepts quite
similar to those in Sturdza's work, and it also saw significant similarities in the
overall look and feel of the designs. 359 It then engaged in its own meticulous
comparison of the ways in which the two architects expressed several
architectural concepts, examining how the defendant's dome design created
effects similar to Sturdza's dome, how the wind-towers appeared similar when
viewed from the front, and how the respective parapets had a similar look and
feel.360
The court of appeals saw no indication that the lower court had considered
the buildings' overall look and feel. The court was "struck by the significant
extent to which Demetriou's design resembles Sturdza's." 361 The buildings'
contours were "virtually identical," both buildings had a pyramid-like clustering
of arches around the front entrances, and there were other general similarities.
Finally, Demetriou achieves the "Islamic" effect sought by the
UAE by expressing and combining his wind-towers, arches,
dome, parapet, and decorative patterning in ways quite similar to
Sturdza's expression and combination of these elements. To sum
up, we think Demetriou's design, though different in some ways
from Sturdza's . . . is sufficiently similar with respect to both
individual elements and overall look and feel for a reasonable jury
to conclude that the two are substantially similar.362
This opinion, like the Tufenkian decision discussed above,363 uses both the
analytical dissection and total concept and feel approaches to determine the
scope of protection for Sturdza's design and the reasonableness of a claim for
substantial similarity of protected expression. The court correctly acknowledges
that unprotectable features, scenes a faire, and standard elements can be selected
and arranged by the architect to make a copyrightable architectural work that
might be infringed by a reproduction that is significantly less than verbatim.
Another case applying the total concept and feel test is Shine v. Childs.364
Here also the plaintiff architect withstood a motion for summary judgment.365
358 Id
3s9 Id. at 1297-98.
360 Id. at 1298-99.
361 Id. at 1299.
362 Id
- See fupra notes 289-94 and accompanying text.
3 382 F. Supp. 2d 602, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
365 Id at 605.
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The plaintiff took a studio class on skyscrapers in 1999 as part of his Masters
program at the Yale School of Architecture. His major project was a design
proposal for a skyscraper that would be built adjacent to a proposed stadium on
the West Side of Manhattan. His preliminary model, titled Shine '99, had a
tower that "taper[ed] as it rises, with 'two straight, parallel, roughly triangular
sides, connected by two twisting facades, resulting in a tower whose top [is] in
the shape of a parallelogram.' "366 He later developed a more sophisticated
model of his design, called Olympic Tower; "a twisting tower with a
symmetrical diagonal column grid, expressed on the exterior ... that follows the
twisting surface created by the floor plates' geometry." 367 In December of
1999, Shine presented these designs, as well as models, renderings, floor plans,
and elevations, to a jury of architectural experts that included David Childs
from the Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (SOM) architectural firm. The reaction
of these experts was very positive, and a large photographic rendering of
Shine's Olympic Tower appeared in the school's alumni magazine along with
favorable quotes from jury members, including Childs.368
Four years later, Childs and SOM presented a proposal for the Freedom
Tower that would be built in lower Manhattan at the World Trade Center site.
Plaintiff Shine was not the only person who thought Freedom Tower was
substantially similar in form and shape to Shine '99, and seemed to have
borrowed the structural grid from his Olympic Tower; people at Yale also
noticed the similarities because one of Shine's original models was retrieved
from storage and placed on the desk of the dean of the architecture school.369
Shine registered his architectural works with the Copyrighted Office and sued
Childs and SOM for copyright infringement.
In ruling on the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court had
no reservations about concluding that both Shine '99 and Olympic Tower were
worthy of protection under the AWCPA370 and sufficiently original to be
entitled to copyright protection.371 The defendants conceded access, and based
on the affidavits of the experts for both sides, the court ruled that there were no
similarities between Shine '99 and Freedom Tower probative of actual copying,
366 Id.
367 Id.
368 Id. at 606.
369 Id. at 606-07.
370 Id. at 609. The court said that standard elements in Shine '99 may not be worthy of
protection, "but the arrangement and composition of the various elements in the model do at
least arguably constitute the 'design of a building' under the AWCPA." The same was true of his
Olympic Tower.
371 Id. at 610-11. Twisting towers had been built before, as have towers with diamond-
windowed facades and support grids like Shine's Olympic Tower, but "defendants do not present
any evidence that the particular combinations of design elements in either . .. are unoriginal."
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but that there was an issue of material fact as to whether Childs had copied
Shine's Olympic Tower.372
The court proceeded to determine whether reasonable jurors could find
substantial similarity between these architectural works. This was an issue of
first impression in the Second Circuit at the time. Total concept and feel was
regarded as the dominant standard in the circuit, and the court concluded that
this standard was "appropriate for architectural works, because the AWCPA
protects the 'overall form' of architectural designs in addition to their individual
copyrightable elements."373 The court also said that it used a reasonable,
ordinary observer test guided by common sense.374 With all of this in mind, the
court concluded that observers would likely disagree as to whether there was
substantial similarity between the towers. Accordingly, defendants' summary
judgment motion was denied as to Shine's Olympic Tower.375 The court said:
Any lay observer examining the two towers side by side would
notice that:
(1) each tower has a form that tapers and twists as it rises, (2)
each tower has an undulating, textured diamond shaped pattern
covering its fagade, and (3) the fagade's diamond pattern
continues to and concludes at the foot of each tower, where one
or more half diamond shapes open up and allow for entry. The
[sic] combination of these elements gives the two towers a similar
'total concept and feel' that is immediately apparent even to an
untrained judicial eye.376
In ruling against the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court
explained and relied upon the test announced in Tufenkian that combined the
analytical dissection and total concept and feel approaches in determining
substantial similarity.3 77
There are, however, limits to how far the total concept and feel standard can
be pushed. If, after analytical dissection, there are but a few protected elements
in a copyrighted architectural work, the plaintiff architect will have to show
near-verbatim copying in order to succeed, even when both works evoke the
372 Id. at 612. This also meant that defendants' summary judgment motion was granted as to
Shine '99.
373 Id. at 614. The court explained this standard by discussing and quoting at length from the
Second Circuit's decision in Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moom/y, Inc., 338 F.3d
127, 134-35 (2d Cir. 2003). In that case, the total concept and feel standard was applied to carpet
designs.
374 Shine, 382 F. Supp. at 615.
375 Id. at 616.
376 Id. at 615.
377 Id. at 614. The court discussed and quoted at length from the Second Circuit's decision in
Tufenkian, 338 F.3d at 134-35.
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same style or school of architecture. This is shown by the decision by the
United States Court of Federal Claims in Trek Leasing, Inc. v. United States. 378 The
plaintiff constructed a building for lease by the United States Postal Service
(USPS) as a post office. It claimed that its copyright in this architectural work
was infringed by a post office constructed for the USPS in another town. The
copyright claim related to the exterior fagade and shell of the building and not
to its floor plans or footprint because these were standard with the USPS.379
The building's shell was in the Pueblo Revival style, and the plaintiff admitted
that some of its design decisions were influenced by economic factors instead
of aesthetics. 380 The alleged infringing post office was built in the same style,
and defendant conceded a general intent to make a similar structure381 So
copying was not an issue.382
The critical issue was whether plaintiff could prove substantial similarity of
protected expression. The court said it could not look for protected expression
in the mere presence of the elements of the Pueblo Revival style. Rather, it had
to "determine whether the use of the elements of the style was original" as well
as consider the impact of external factors on the scope of plaintiffs
architectural work copyright. 383 The court said that once it determined the
protectable aspects of the plaintiffs design, it would then make the comparison
with defendant's structure. It noted that this approach was similar to the test
applied with regard to computer programs, and to the analysis followed by the
D.C. Circuit in Sturdga.384
The parties agreed that the hallmarks of the Pueblo Revival style included "a
flat roof with parapet, stepped-back roof lines, wood canales, apparent wood
lintels, outside walls made of stone, heavy massing, and muntins used for the
glazing on doors and windows."385 The court then stated that "[t]he hallmarks
of a popular architectural style, as such, are not protectable" because (1) the
definition of architectural work does not extend to standard features, (2) the
interplay of the idea/expression dichotomy and the merger doctrine, and (3)
scenes a faire.386 When the plaintiffs work was carefully examined by the court in
light of these principles, it was clear that it had few protectable elements. In
378 66 Fed. Cl. 8 (Fed. Cl. 2005).
37 Id. at 10 & n.2.
380 Id. at 12.
381 Id. at 11.
382 Id. The court noted that Nimmer said that using a copyrighted work as model, template, or
even inspiration could be cause for inferring copying.
383 Id. at 12.
384 Id. (citing several appellate court decisions involving computer programs as well as Sturdza
v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d at 1295 (involving the alleged infringement of the design for
an embassy building)). See also supra notes 348-64 and accompanying text.
M Trek Leasing, 66 Fed. Cl. at 13.
386 Id.
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other words, the copyright on this architectural work was thin.?8 The court
then went through an exhaustive substantial similarity analysis, applying both
the ordinary and more discerning observer tests, and compared elements like
stone and mortar, canales, muntins, ceilings and porches, and overall
structure.388 It concluded that there was little original work that the defendant
could have copied, and that the similarities between the structures were
attributable to USPS requirements and the Pueblo Revival style. The "lack of
substantial similarity, under the heightened more discerning observer test,
between the remaining parts of the original work and those of the allegedly
infringing work, makes clear that there was not copyright infringement in this
case."389
VIII. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The AWCPA has been interpreted and applied by many federal courts since
it was enacted in 1990. In passing this legislation, Congress determined that a
work of architecture is a "writing" under the Constitution fully deserving of
copyright protection, and that affording protection "should stimulate excellence
in design, thereby enriching our public environment in keeping with the
constitutional goal." 390 I agree that works of architecture, both plans and
completed buildings, deserve protection as works of authorship under the
Copyright Act but I am reluctant to reach a conclusion on whether the AWCPA
has had much of an impact on stimulating excellence in design in the United
States. I am inclined to say that it has not made much of a difference one way
or the other, primarily because the scope of protection for most architectural
works is very thin.
My general observations about the impact of the AWCPA are as follows:
(1) Courts have not had much difficulty deciding whether or
not a particular structure is a building that falls within the
AWCPA's definition of architectural work.
(2) Consistent with pre-1990 decisions, the courts have afforded
protection to fairly simple plans and designs provided such
plans are more refined than rudimentary ideas and concepts.
There is not a constructability test for copyright protection.
387 Id. at 17. The court added that the lack of protected elements in plaintiffs design was
emphasized to an even greater extent after accounting for testimony by defendant's expert. See
also id. at 18. The work "is composed almost entirely of elements that originate in either the
USPS drawings or the BIA Pueblo Revival architectural style."
388 Id. at 18-23.
389 Id. at 23.
390 H.R. REP., supra note 10, at 12.
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(3) Disputes over who owns the copyright on plans and
blueprints were often litigated before 1990 and they have
remained common after the passage of the AWCPA.
(4) Suits alleging infringement of plans and blueprints are
litigation staples today as they were before 1990. The
significant change made by the AWCPA in regards to an
architect's rights in plans and blueprints is that it is now
firmly established that the unauthorized use of plans to build
the structure they depict is an infringement.
(5) The limitations on the architect's exclusive rights in Section
120(a) permitting unauthorized photographs of buildings
that are ordinarily visible from a public place and in Section
120(b) authorizing the owner of a building to alter or
destroy it without the architect's permission seem clear
enough standing alone but neither limitation has been
subject to much litigation. It is uncertain whether these
limitations are restricted, if at all, by provisions in the Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990 that afford protection to certain
works of visual art that are incorporated into buildings.
(6) The scope of protection for most architectural works is thin.
This means that an architect who is alleging that the
copyright on a relatively simple structure like a home or a
condo complex has been infringed must prove near identity
between his or her architectural work and the alleged
infringing work.
My observation regarding "thin" copyright protection for architectural
works comes with a qualification. Several decisions show that with more
complex structures like a skyscraper or a large office building, the totality
approach to determining substantial similarity arguably affords "thicker"
protection, at least when the plaintiffs complex building has a distinctive
appearance or style. For example, Frank Gehry's massive, titanium clad
Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, Spain, with its "torqued and sensually curving
pillars that support the glass-and-steel ceiling," has a unique look and feel that
does not seem to fit in a particular school style.39' Copyright arguably affords it
much more protection then Renzo Piano's more rectilinear Merill Collection
building in Houston, Texas. 392
There are, however, limitations on the reach of the totality approach due to
the importance of subtracting unprotectable elements from the architectural
work that allegedly has been infringed. The totality approach should be used in
391 Matt Tyrnauer, Arhitecture in the Age of Geby, VANiTY FAIR, Aug. 2010, at 156.
392 Cf id
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conjunction with the subtractive approach to determine substantial similarity
while simultaneously adhering to the AWCPA's definition of architectural work.
Any features associated with a particular style or school of architecture should
be subtracted from the substantial similarity comparison of architectural works
because they are unprotectable due to the idea/expression dichotomy, the
merger, and the scenes a faire doctrines or because the elements should be
regarded as unprotectable individual standard features of that style.
Although I am hesitant to say whether or not the AWCPA has stimulated
excellence in design or encouraged creativity by architects, I am comfortable
saying that this statute has generated litigation. The number of opinions
involving infringement of architectural works that were reported prior to 1990
seems small in comparison to the number of cases that have interpreted and
applied the AWCPA during the last twenty years. It has generated additional
work for lawyers and, at the same time, has perhaps given architects some
leverage or bargaining power when they believe that another architect has
borrowed far too much from one of their designs. Of course, threats of
litigation and possible settlements do not necessarily mean that the upset
architect would have been successful had he or she actually sued and gone to
trial. As noted above, most architect plaintiffs face a daunting task because
ordinarily they will have to show close to verbatim copying in order to be
successful due to the thinness of their architectural work copyright.
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